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Abstract 
This thesis aims to examine empirically the effect of political institutions on 
regional economic growth, with special reference to China's administrative system of 
provinces administering counties (sheng guan xian, PAC). This study uses 
county-level data of Zhejiang and Fujian for the period 1989-2003. While Zhejiang 
has been adhering to the PAC system for several decades, Fujian has adopted a 
different administrative system of prefecture level cities administering counties (shi 
guan xian). We test the hypothesis that PAC would exert a positive impact on the 
growth rate of the real GDP per capita by regressing the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita on the dummy for the PAC system and a set of controlled explanatory variables 
such as the foreign direct investment ratio and investment ratio. Our empirical results 
demonstrate that comparing with the administrative system of Fujian, Zhejiang's PAC 
System exerts negative impact on counties' economic growth. The empirical findings 
of this thesis may contribute to the recent heated debate on whether PAC should be 
adopted by all provinces of China and have important policy implications for the 
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In recent years, calls for administrative reform are gradually gathering momentum 
stimulating debate on the relationship between China's system of administrative 
jurisdictions (行政區劃）and economic growth (Xu (2004), Wang (2004), Wu (2004)， 
Zhang (2004)). More specifically, the debate is about whether an administrative 
system with provinces administering counties (PAC) (Sheng guan xian zhi du) is 
better than the other arrangements in enhancing administrative efficiency and 
promoting economic growth of counties. The aim of this thesis is to examine 
empirically the effect of PAC on economic growth of counties using the growth 
regression approach (see the survey by Temple (1999)). Zhejiang and Fujian are 
selected for this purpose because Zhejiang is the only province which has been 
adhering to PAC since 1953, while Fujian has been implementing a system of 
prefecture-level cities administering counties system (CAC)' (Shi guan xian zhi du) 
since 1983^. Since the two provinces are using different administrative systems, we 
can assess the effect of PAC by comparing the economic performance of Zhejiang 
with that of Fujian. 
‘CAC to be explained below. 
2 The other reasons for choosing Fujian will be discussed later. 
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At the beginning of economic reforms in 1978，Zhejiang's level of development 
was not high relative to other provinces such as Guangdong and Jiangsu. As shown in 
Table 1.1, Zhejiang's GDP ranking is only among all the provinces of China in 
1978. Since 1978, Zhejiang has experienced very rapid economic growth. In Table 1.2 
and Figure 1.1，Zhejiang has, from 1979 - 2003, an average growth rate of real GDP 
per capita of 12.27% which is higher than that of China as a whole. Moreover, except 
for 1983 and 1989, Zhejiang has maintained a growth rate of real GDP per capita 
higher than that of China. The result of this sustained and rapid economic growth is 
that Zhejiang's GDP ranking has risen from 12^to in 2003. Not only has the 
overall GDP of Zhejiang increased swiftly, its counties also have experienced 
spectacular economic growth since 1978. Table 1.3 shows the averages of the 
counties' growth rates in real GDP per capita in Zhejiang and Fujian from 1990 to 
20033. At the sub provincial level, the counties of Zhejiang have experienced an 
average of 14% economic growth during these 14 years. According to the 
announcement of National Bureau of Statistics of China on 25 October 2005, 30 
counties (including county level cities) of Zhejiang Province have been included in 
the list of China's top 100 counties in 20044. 丁。explain the rapid economic 
development of Zhejiang's counties, some recent studies propose that PAC of 
3 The data starts from 1990 due to the limitation of the county level data. 
4 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China Webpage http://210.72.32.6/cgi-
bin/biuale.cei/b/u/a/httpra^.www.stats.gov.cn/tisi/qtsi/bqxssi/t20051025 402287154.htm 
2 
Zhejiang may be the main factor (Gu (2004)，Hu (2004)，Wu Yun Fa (2004), Xu 
(2004)，Zhang (2003)). Is there any relationship between PAC and Zhejiang's 
counties' rapid economic growth? To answer this question, this study performs an 
empirical research based on the data of Zhejiang and Fujian's counties and employs 
the standard growth regression model to test whether is PAC exerts positive impact on 
the economic growth of counties. 
1.2 Contribution 
With regard to the literature of China's administrative system, there are some 
previous studies arguing for and against the implementation of PAC or CAC (Gu 
(2004), Hu (2004), Li (2004), Wu Yun Fa (2004), Wang (2004), Xu (2004), Zhang 
(2003)). They also discuss whether PAC should be adopted by all provinces in China. 
There is no consensus on this issue. However, these studies are descriptive in nature. 
Their arguments are not supported by any formal and rigorous empirical works. This 
thesis is a first attempt to fill this gap by using the growth regression model to 
estimate the effect of PAC System on the economic growth of counties. By adopting 
the analytical framework of previous studies (e.g. Barro (1991)，Barro and Martin 
(2004)，Mankiw et al (1992)), we extend their regression models from countries to 
county of China to examine the effect of PAC System on economic growth of counties. 
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After estimating the regression models with the pooled county-level data of 
Zhejiang and Fujian, we have found that the dummy variable introduced to capture 
the effect of PAC System on counties' economic growth is significant in most of the 
models with a negative coefficient. This result shows that the effect of PAC System on 
promoting counties' economic growth is not very obvious. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies (e.g. Wang (2004)) which are skeptical of the positive effect of 
PAC System. Also, our estimation results tend to support the disadvantages of PAC 
System proposed Xu (2004), Wang (2005), and Zhang (2003). 
With regard to the estimation results of our model, the most salient policy 
implication is that if economic factor is an important consideration, CAC System 
should not be totally replaced by PAC System or at least should be preserved in Fujian 
for the moment because CAC System may have positive contributions to counties' 
economic growth. Since PAC System will probably be widely implemented in China 
in the future as mentioned in the 11出 Five Year Plan, we suggest that the 
administrative reform should be implemented gradually in some provinces and 
supplemented by other measures to enhance the administrative capability of the 
provinces since the administrative burden of provinces is greater under PAC System. 
These measures may include improving transportation and communication 
infrastructure so that the potential negative effects of the reform can be reduced. 
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This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. 
The second chapter is the overview of China's system of administrative jurisdictions. 
In this chapter, some background information about the development of 
administrative system of China will be discussed. The third chapter is the literature 
review. The fourth chapter is the methodology of this research. The detail of the 
regression model we use will be discussed in this chapter. The fifth chapter is the 
estimation results of our regression models. Several interpretations of these results 
will also be discussed. Finally, the sixth chapter is the policy implications and 
conclusion of our study. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of China's System of Administrative Jurisdictions 
Before studying the effect of the administrative systems of Zhejiang and 
Fujian on their economic growth, some background information about the system of 
administrative jurisdictions of China will be provided in order to better motivate the 
analysis in the later part of our study. This chapter briefly introduces the development 
of the administrative system of China. Then the development of the administrative 
system of Zhejiang and Fujian will also be introduced. 
2.1 Development of China's System of Administrative 
Jurisdictions 
2.1.1 History and Features 
China's administrative system has several thousand years of history. According 
to Liu (1996), China started developing her administrative system before the Qin 
Dynasty. China's system of administrative jurisdiction, according to Wang (1994) and 
Liu (1996), is a tool of the ruling class to achieve political control over the whole 
nation. The most basic characteristic of China's administrative system is a hierarchy 
made up of multiple tiers of governments evolving in history in response to changing 
political and economic situations. 
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Wang (1994) suggests that China's administrative system has several features 
that are worth discussing. In history, at the beginning of a new dynasty, the 
administrative hierarchy was designed to maintain political stability. For example, 
during the Yuan Dynasty, the Mongolian central government established a tier of 
administrative hierarchy called Xing Sheng to ensure absolute control over the Han by 
military force. This example shows that the design of administrative hierarchy is to a 
large extent influenced by political considerations. While the design of the 
administrative hierarchy was largely affected by political considerations at the 
beginning of a new dynasty, economic considerations became more and more 
important in determining the administrative setup as the economy grew. The structure 
changed to cope with the needs induced by economic development. For example, as 
we will mention later, the central government introduced the CAC System in the 
1980s in order to use the prefecture-level cities (dijishi) to promote the economic 
growth of counties and villages. Another factor driving jurisdictional changes is 
geographic. According to Wang (1994), the administrative hierarchy is to a certain 
extent affected by geographic factors. For example, in May 1993, the State Council 
has determined the standards of establishing cities. These standards are related to 
demographic and economic indicators. Counties must satisfy these standards before 
they can be upgraded to become county-level cities or prefecture-level cities. 
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However, for some important coastal counties and counties located near the Yellow 
River or Yangtze River, the population and economic indicators requirement for 
gaining city status is relatively lower (Wang (1994)). So we know that geographic 
factor is also having a significant impact on the administrative hierarchy. 
2.1.2 Evolution of Current System 
In this section, the details of PAC and CAC will be discussed. In short, PAC is a 
system of administrative jurisdictions under which counties are directly administered 
by provincial governments. CAC is another system whereby counties are administered 
by prefecture-level cities while provincial governments administer the latter. The 
promotion system and distribution of administrative power under these two systems 
will also be discussed. Since PAC and CAC are the focus of our study, discussing 
their evolution and characteristics can better motivate our later analysis. 
The focus of this study is on the relationship between China's administrative 
system and economic growth of China. We will mainly discuss the administrative 
system after the establishment of the People Republic of China in 1949. After the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949, there were only 3 tiers of governments: central, 
provincial and county (Hu (2004)) as shown in Figure 2.1. In addition, there is also a 
prefecture level between the provinces and counties. From Table 2.1, there were 193 
prefecture level jurisdictions (diqu) in 1951. According to Chung and Lam (2004), 
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whether prefectures form a legal tier of administrative system is not clear. In theory, 
prefecture governments act as representatives for the provincial government to help 
manage the counties. Under this system, all the counties can be regarded as being 
administered by the provincial governments (PAC). After 1951, the number of 
prefecture-level jurisdictions declined. By 1960，the number of prefectures greatly 
decreased by 40% from 193 in 1951 to 116 as shown in Table 2.1. Later, prefectures 
resumed an increasing trend after 1960. Until 1978, the total number of prefectures 
was 173. It increased by 50% and helped provinces administer over 80% of the 
counties. 
2.1.2.1 Prefecture Level Jurisdictions and Prefecture-Level Cities 
The most important and fundamental difference between PAC and CAC is that 
prefecture-level cities exist between provincial governments and subordinate counties 
in CAC. So discussing the originality and development of prefecture-level cities is 
essential for our later analysis. 
In 1950s, there was a type of cities called prefecture-level cities，as jurisdictions 
between the provinces and counties. According to Dai (2000)，prefecture-level cities 
can be established in two ways: turning prefectures into prefecture-level cities (di gai 
5 After the establishment of PRC in 1949，there was no difference between prefecture-level cities and 
county level cities. Until 1983，in order to better identify the city and for ease of management, 
prefecture-level cities and county level cities are identified separately. The number of prefecture-level 
city and county level city before 1983 in Table 2.1 are calculated after the 1983 differentiation. 
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shi) or changing counties into prefecture-level cities (xian gai shi). The former is the 
dominant way of establishing prefecture-level cities after 1983. In 1951, there were 69 
prefecture-level cities in China as shown in Table 2.1. After that, the number of 
prefecture-level cities kept a moderately increasing trend. By 1978, the number 
increased to 98. According to Hu (2004), these cities were established by merging 
I several counties in order to ensure food supply from the counties to urban residents. 
Their main responsibility is not to administer counties at that time, though there were 
a few which did assume such a function since 1950s. According to Dai (2000), Luda, 
a prefecture-level city in Liaoning, was the first prefecture-level city established to 
administer counties in October 1950; Nanjing was another. In 1958，Liaoning 
abolished all the prefectures and established 10 prefecture-level cities. By then, there 
were 28 out of 68 prefecture-level cities in China with the responsibility of 
administering counties. On 17 September, 1959, the central government formally 
announced that the arrangement prefecture-level cities administering county was legal 
leading to more and more prefecture-level cities to administering counties. However, 
the central government later put a halt to the increasing trend due to the inundating of 
prefecture-level cities. As shown in Table 2.1, prefectures were re-established to 
administer the counties since 1961. 
As mentioned before, the constitutional status of prefectures was ambiguous. It 
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was only in 1975 that the prefecture was formally recognized as an official layer of 
the local administrative system in the constitution. According to Dai (2000), 
beginning with Luda in Liaoning prefecture-level city administering counties, in the 
next 30 years, the system of prefectures helping provinces administer counties 
coexisted with the system of prefecture-level cities administering counties. According 
to Xu (2004), the former was the major mode of administrative setup in China until 
the beginning of 1980s. 
In order to promote rural economic development by cities, the central 
government promoted the prefecture-level cities administering counties system (CAC) 
from the 1980s onward. Prefectures were gradually abolished to be replaced by 
prefecture-level cities. In 1982, the CAC System was adopted by Jiangsu on a trial 
basis, with the reform subsequently approved by the central government. In February, 
the central government announced that the system of prefecture-level cities 
administering counties should be progressively adopted by all provinces. Guangdong 
and Liaoning were the next provinces to abolish all prefectures to fully utilize 
prefecture-level cities to administer counties. By 1998，prefecture-level cities were 
administering over 70% of total counties in China. With the CAC System increasingly 
becoming the major mode of local administrative system, and China has formally 
established a 5-tier administrative system: central, provincial, prefecture-level cities, 
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counties (including county-level cities), and towns. 
2.1.2.2 Promotion System 
A promotion system has emerged since the 1980s setting standards for 
jurisdictions to gain city statuses. In April 1986, the State Council announced the 
standards for gaining the status of prefecture-level cities: (1) non-farming population 
in urban district over 250 thousands. (2) GDP over 1 billion yuan middle size city. (3) 
Being the political, economy, science and cultural centre with significant "radiation" 
(fushe) effects on the counties nearby. Since then, as shown in Table 2.1, the number 
of prefecture-level cities increased rapidly. It has increased from 166 in 1986 to 283 in 
2005. On the other hand, the prefectures decreased also rapidly from 119 in 1986 to 
only 17 left in 2005. Prefecture-level cities have replaced prefectures in administering 
counties. 
The existing promotion system came into effect in 1994 (See Dai (2000)). 
Specifically, counties can become county-level cities if they meet several standards 
set by the State Council: (1) population density over 400 people/square kilometer. (2) 
Non-agricultural population over 150 thousands and not less than 30% of county total 
population. (3) Share of gross value of industrial output in gross value of industrial 
and agricultural output not less than 80% and 1.5 billion yuan. (4) GDP not less than 1 
billion yuan, tertiary sector production over 20% of total county GDP. (5) Fiscal 
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income not less than 100 yuan/person, total fiscal income not less than 60,000 
thousand yuan^. 
Similarly, county-level cities may be promoted to prefecture-level cities if they 
can satisfy several standards: (1) non-agricultural population in urban district over 250 
thousands. Non-agricultural population over 200 thousands in the district where the 
county government locates (2) gross value of industrial and agricultural output over 3 
billion yuan with gross value of industrial output over 80%. (3) GDP over 2.5 billion 
yuan, the value of tertiary sector production more than that of primary sector 
production and makes up over 35% of GDP. (4) Fiscal income more than 200 million 
yuan. Cities with higher administration ranks have greater administrative power. Thus, 
under this promotion system, county officials have incentives to have their counties 
promoted to county-level city. Also, mayors of county-level cities have incentive to 
have their county-level cities promoted to prefecture-level city. For example, with the 
prefecture-level city status, a city can have its own subordinate counties, have larger 
shares of fiscal resources and more authority to approve investment projects and FDI, 
not to mention the better remuneration for the officials after the promotion. 
From the above discussion, the promotion system of administrative hierarchy 
shows that the system of administrative jurisdictions and economic growth are inter-
6 These standards can be found in chapter 4 of Dai (2000) 
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related. Promotion of an administrative jurisdiction is largely affected by the 
economic development level of the place. This relationship between the two further 
motivates us to study the effect of administrative system on economic growth. 
2.1.2.3 Motivation of Adopting CAC System 
Since the early 1980s, CAC System has gradually been becoming the major 
mode of local administrative system. According to Zhang (2003), this tendency is 
actually an outcome of the planned economy. At the beginning of 1980s, although the 
economy was gradually being transformed into a market economy as a result of 
economic reform, the economy of China was by and large a planned economy under 
which resources were largely controlled and allocated by the government. Poor 
transport infrastructure and communications networks rendered the multiple tiers of 
government necessary if the state was to perform the complicated role as a planner to 
allocate resources under central planning. More tiers of government meant that each 
government was smaller in size and managed a smaller number of subordinate 
governments. Zhang (2003) argues that implementing CAC System to help manage 
the counties was rational at that time because the market system was not well 
developed in China at the beginning of 1980s. Without the invisible hand to allocate 
resources, more tiers of government could better manage the vast economy and better 
perform the function of resources allocation. From the motivation of adopting CAC 
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System, we know that counties and prefectures changing into prefecture-level cities 
were also partly due to the administrative need of China. 
2.2 Administrative System of Zhejiang 
In this section, we will discuss the Zhejiang's system of administrative 
jurisdictions, sub-provincial fiscal system and motivation of adhering to PAC System. 
Zhejiang is chosen to be the target of our study because Zhejiang is the only province 
in China adhering to PAC System for several decades and becomes a model of PAC 
System. Many studies (e.g. Gu (2004), Hu (2004)，Xu (2004)) argue that the PAC 
System may be the engine of Zhejiang's rapid economic growth, so we choose 
Zhejiang to study the effect of PAC System on economic growth. 
2.2.1 Evolution of System of Administrative Jurisdictions 
Table 2.2 gives us a general idea of the evolution of Zhejiang's administrative 
system. In 1949, there were 78 counties and 6 county-level cities in Zhejiang. 
Between the province and the counties, there were 10 prefectures and 3 prefecture-
level cities in Zhejiang. Since 1953, Zhejiang has adopted the Province-
Administering-County System (PAC). Under this system, counties within Zhejiang 
were directly governed by the provincial government. At that time, prefectures were 
only representing the province and not a formal tier of government in the 
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administrative hierarchy until 1975. Moreover, since 1949, there was a decreasing 
trend in the number of prefectures. In 1983, after Jiangsu and Liaoning provinces 
experimented with the CAC System in the whole province, the central government 
announced a decree to widely implement CAC System and establish prefecture-level 
cities in all provinces of China. Following the decree of the central government, 
Zhejiang started abolishing prefectures and establishing prefecture-level cities with 
the counties (including county level cities) were put under them. As shown in Table 
2.2, prefecture-level cities greatly increased 100% from 3 to 6. Since then, Zhejiang 
formally has a four-tier administrative system: province, prefecture-level city, county 
(including county-level cities), towns and villages. Each tier has its own government 
and separate budget. 
By 2003, all the prefectures were abolished and there were 11 prefecture-level 
cities within Zhejiang. However, Zhejiang only followed the decree of implementing 
CAC System nominally. Actually, she has been adhering to the PAC System since 
1953. Although counties are apparently subordinate to prefecture-level cities, as 
shown in Figure 2.2, counties (including county-level cities) are directly governed by 
the provincial government with the exception of Ningbo. For counties under other 
prefecture-level-cities in Zhejiang, the provincial government actually administers the 
county governments' fiscal matters and personnel appointment. For example, fiscal 
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subsidies are directly transferred to county governments from the provincial 
government without passing through the prefecture-level cities under which the 
counties are put. Also, the county magistrates and county-level cities key cadres are 
directly appointed by the Zhejiang provincial government. So the prefecture-level 
cities have less responsibility and no authority to manage the fiscal and personnel 
issues of their subordinate counties. According to Zhang (2004)，Ningbo is the only 
prefecture-level city in Zhejiang actually administering its subordinate counties. 
Ningbo is responsible for managing the counties' fiscal matters, personnel 
appointment, approving investment projects and foreign direct investment projects. 
Under Zhejiang's PAC System, the county-level jurisdictions have more or less 
the same status as the prefecture-level cities they belong. Since both counties and 
prefecture-level cities are at the same level under this system, county governments are 
granted more power to approve investment projects, foreign direct investments and 
make administrative matters, these powers would otherwise be entrusted with 
prefecture-level cities under CAC System. Counties having more decision making 
authority is thus another distinctive feature of PAC System. 
2.2.2 Sub-Provincial Fiscal System 
After the tax reform in 1994, different tax revenue items were divided into 3 
categories: central government fixed revenue, provincial government fixed revenue, 
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central and provincial sharing revenue. The aims of this reform were re-centralization 
of tax revenue and increase the income of the central government. To satisfy the 
command of the central government, provincial government needs to transfer more 
tax revenue to the central government than before. As a result, more tax revenue was 
siphoned off from the subordinate cities and counties and led to a phenomenon of 
revenues shifting upwards. County-level jurisdictions were losing out in the process 
of competing for fiscal revenue because county-level jurisdictions have lower 
administrative rank and less administrative power than provincial governments and 
prefecture-level cities. Counties under CAC System may subject to the predation of 
both provincial governments and the prefecture-level cities. In the case of Zhejiang's 
PAC System, fiscal resources of the counties may be siphoned off by the provincial 
government only. Without the oppression of prefecture-level cities, counties may be 
better off under PAC System. This is one of the previous studies' arguments for PAC 
System. Discussion of the sub-provincial fiscal system can show more differences 
between PAC System and CAC System from different angles which would better 
facilitate our later discussion. 
2.2.3 Zhejiang's Motivation of Adhering to PAC System 
There are some studies trying to explain why Zhejiang has adhered to PAC 
instead of other administrative systems. Wu (2004) suggests that Zhejiang has adhered 
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to PAC System because PAC System is particularly suitable to the situation of 
Zhejiang province. The area of the whole province is only 101.8 thousand square 
kilometer and it is one of the smallest provinces in China (See Figure 2.4 and 2.5). It 
is only larger than Ningxia and Hainan Province. Due to short distances between the 
provincial government, prefecture-level cities and counties, decrees from the 
provincial government could be effectively transmitted to county-level jurisdictions, 
so the provincial government was able to govern relatively larger number of 
jurisdictions without delegating powers to an intermediate tier of governments. This 
geographical advantage has enabled Zhejiang to adhere to PAC system with fewer 
tiers of jurisdictions. 
2.3 Administrative system of Fujian 
We have also chosen Fujian for our empirical study because it has adopted an 
administrative system different from Zhejiang. Fujian adopted the CAC System since 
1983, so Fujian can be used to compare with Zhejiang to examine the effect of 
different systems. In this section, we will discuss the evolution of Fujian's 
administrative system and sub-provincial fiscal system. 
For the administrative system of Fujian, as shown in Table 2.3, in 1949, Fujian 
has 67 counties and 2 prefecture-level cities without any county level cities at all. 
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Between provinces and counties, there were prefectures and prefecture-level cities 
existing at the same time. In legal terms, there were only two tiers of jurisdiction 
within Fujian before 1975: province and county. The provincial government was 
responsible for administering all the counties within the province. 
As mentioned before, in 1983，after the trial of prefecture-level city 
administering county system in Jiangsu and Liaoning, the central government issued a 
decree to promote CAC System as the administrative system in all provinces. As a 
result, Fujian followed this decree and adopted a 4-tier administrative system as 
shown in Figure 2.3: province, prefecture-level city, county (including county level 
city), and township. As shown in Table 2.3, in 1983，the number of prefecture-level 
cities has exhibited a persistent increasing trend after 1983. Prefectures were 
abolished to establish prefecture-level cities and all the counties have become 
subordinate to the prefecture-level cities and were no longer administered by the 
provincial government directly. By 2003，there were 9 prefecture-level cities in Fujian, 
a 4 fold since 1982. Under CAC System, prefecture-level cities assume the 
responsibility of managing their subordinate counties affairs including fiscal 
budgeting, personnel appointment, approval of investment projects, etc. 
Let us take fiscal aspect as an example. When fiscal subsidies are given by the 
provincial government to the counties, the provincial government first transfers 
2 0 
subsidies to the corresponding prefecture-level cities, and then the prefecture-level 
cities transfers the subsidies to their subordinate counties. Also, tax revenue for 
central and provincial government, which is collected by county governments, should 
be first submitted to the prefecture-level cities under CAC System. Since the 
prefecture-level cities have higher administrative rank than the counties, the former 
can obtain more fiscal income from the province and even siphon the fiscal resources 
from the subordinate counties. This is also the main argument against CAC System. 
Under CAC System, the power to appoint the county government officials 
resides in the prefecture-level city government to which the county belongs. Moreover, 
the power to approve investment project and foreign direct investment in the counties 
is also held by the prefecture-level cities. The county government needs to submit 
formal application to the prefecture-level cities for approving investment projects in 
the county. Under this administrative system, the provincial government does not have 
direct control over the counties. Instead, the prefecture-level city acts as an 
intermediary between the provincial government and counties and is entrusted with 
the task of managing the counties. The provincial government only needs to manage 
the subordinate prefecture-level cities. Comparing with PAC System, the counties' 
administrative rank and corresponding authority in decision making are lower under 
CAC System. This is the one of the most important differences between the two 
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systems. 
To conclude, the most salient feature distinguishing PAC from CAC is that 
CAC has more tiers of administrative hierarchy. When the administrative jurisdictions 
further go up the hierarchy, they can have more administrative power. This may imply 
more fiscal resources can be obtained. With regard to the issue of PAC System, 
Zhejiang has been adhering to it for many years and its spectacular economic growth 




The aim of this thesis is to examine the effect of the Province Administering 
County (PAC) System on economic growth of Zhejiang's counties. Actually, there are 
a lot of studies about the PAC System recently and these studies provide a copious 
amount of materials and analyses of the PAC System. Although these studies may not 
be rigorous empirical research on the PAC System, it is useful to review the related 
literature to understand the arguments for and against the PAC System. 
3.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Province Administering 
County(PAC) System 
There has recently emerged a large literature on the pros and cons of the PAC 
System. Not a few stress the advantages of PAC System and support the switch to the 
PAC System. There are several arguments in favor of the PAC System as we shall 
summarize below. 
The first one is that it can effectively enhance the efficiency of government 
administration (Wu (2004)). Previous studies point out that more tiers of local 
government may slow down the transmission of and distort government decrees. 
Under the PAC System, counties are directly governed by the provincial government. 
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Policies of the provincial government can be transmitted more rapidly to the counties 
without passing through prefecture-level cities. Without prefecture-level cities as an 
intermediary, the distortion of the decrees can be reduced. 
The second advantage of PAC System pertains to the promotion of counties' 
economic growth and the reduction of income disparity between counties (Wu (2004)). 
In the case of Zhejiang, the counties in the northern and eastern part of the province 
are growing faster than those in the western and southern part. For the 
underdeveloped counties in the western and southern part, they have been suffering 
from serious fiscal deficits. According to Wu (2004), under the PAC System, the 
provincial government has given more transfer payments to help these 
underdeveloped counties solve their fiscal problems. Moreover, since counties are 
directly governed by the provincial government, transfer payments can be transferred 
entirely to the counties without being siphoned off by prefecture-level cities. With 
more fiscal support from the provincial government, these underdeveloped counties 
can balance their budgets with fiscal resources to promote economic growth. So the 
PAC System may help reduce income disparity between the rich and poor counties. 
There are also studies pointing out that the PAC System is not a perfect 
administrative system. It also has its own drawbacks. The first disadvantage is the 
increase in the administrative costs of the provincial government. For most provinces 
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in China other than Zhejiang, counties are under the management of prefecture-level 
cities. The provincial government only has to manage the prefecture-level cities, 
relieving the provincial government of the administrative burden in managing a huge 
number of counties. However, under the PAC System, the provincial government is 
responsible for governing all the counties and also the prefecture-level cities within 
the province. In Zhejiang, there are a total of 58 counties (including county level cities) 
and 11 prefecture-level cities that the provincial government needs to manage, thereby 
stretching its administrative capacity to the limit (Sheng fa gai wei (2005), Wang 
(2004)). The local needs of the counties cannot be observed by the officials of 
provincial government promptly. This may adversely affect management efficiency. 
The second disadvantage is that the PAC System lowers the incentive of 
prefecture-level cities to promote county economic growth (Wang (2004)). In the case 
of the PAC System, provincial government is in charge of fiscal and personnel matters 
of the counties. The fiscal system of the counties is no longer supervised by the 
prefecture-level cities. As a result, prefecture-level cities have no incentive to promote 
the economic growth of counties and help them maintain fiscal balance. According to 
Wang (2004), prefecture-level cities become focusing on the development of the city 
district by putting all the fiscal resources in it. Without the fiscal support of the 
prefecture-level cities, the economic growth of the counties may be adversely affected. 
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The third disadvantage pertains to the duplication of infrastructure and the 
inefficient allocation of resources (Zhang (2004)). Under the PAC system, counties 
and prefecture-level cities are more or less at the same level, their policies are made 
and implemented separately without coordination. This results in the duplication of 
facilities thereby wasting resources. 
3.2 Literature on Prefecture-level City Administering County(CAC) 
System 
The previous studies analyzing the pros and cons of the PAC System usually 
compare the PAC System with the CAC System. Those studies supporting the PAC 
System to be adopted by most provinces in China have pointed out the disadvantages 
of CAC System to be discussed below. 
The first disadvantage is the exploitation of counties by prefecture-level cities 
(Xu (2004), Wang (2005)). Governments of counties and prefecture-level cities have 
the incentive to speed up the development of their jurisdictions. According to Wang 
(2005), in order to develop their own economies, local governments try to retain fiscal 
resources within their own jurisdictions. Under the CAC System, the counties are 
subordinate to the prefecture-level cities. Prefecture-level cities may exploit their 
subordinate counties by sharing less fiscal resources with the counties. For example, 
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when the provincial government transfers fiscal subsidies to the counties, these 
subsidies are first distributed to the prefecture-level cities under CAC System. These 
prefecture-level cities may however retain disproportion shares of these subsidies. 
This phenomenon is particularly common in the prefecture-level cities where both the 
cities and their subordinate counties are relatively poor. Poor prefecture-level cities 
have higher incentives to keep larger shares of these subsidies to make up for their 
revenue shortfalls and pass less on to the counties (Refer to Xu (2004), Wang(2005) 
for further detail). Chung and Lam (2004) also has a similar view. They put forward a 
budgetary proposition to explain why county-level cities want to secure prefecture-
level city status because prefecture-level cities have more power and can extract fiscal 
resources from subordinate counties under their jurisdictions. According to Chung and 
Lam (2004)，from the result of a survey in 1999, 70% of the counties were 
discontented with fiscal extractions by the prefecture-level cities. This example has 
concretely demonstrated the seriousness of fiscal extractions by prefecture-level cities. 
Without getting enough fiscal subsidies from the prefecture-level cities, the county 
governments' fiscal balance will deteriorate and fewer resources are available for 
economic development. So this may hinder the economic growth of the counties 
under CAC System. 
The second disadvantage is that the CAC System has the effect of distracting 
27 
prefecture-level cities from the affairs of city districts (Zhang (2003)). Under the CAC 
System, prefecture-level cities have a wide range of responsibilities as far as the 
management of their subordinate counties is concerned. They include fiscal matters, 
appointment of cadres, approving investment projects, transportation and 
infrastructure. Other than managing the affairs of subordinate counties, prefecture-
level governments also have to deal with the affairs concerning the prefecture-level 
city district. The affairs of subordinate counties may thus distract the attention of 
prefecture-level cities away from their own city districts. 
The third disadvantage is high administrative cost and the lowering of 
administrative efficiency (Xu (2004)). Before 1983, provincial governments 
administered counties directly with only 3 tiers of administrative system within a 
province: province, county, and towns and villages. After the implementation of the 
CAC System in 1983，the local administrative system has changed from 3 tiers to 4 
tiers, i.e., province, prefecture-level city, county, and townships. When the provincial 
government issues an edict to the counties, the edict must go through the prefecture-
level cities. With an additional tier between the provincial government and the 
counties, the edict may be delayed. As a result, administrative efficiency of the 
governments will also be lowered. Also, with an additional tier of government, more 
officials are recruited to maintain the normal operation of the government. So, the 
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salary of these additional officials under CAC System will also significantly increase 
the administration cost. 
Actually, other than these disadvantages mentioned above, Zhang (2003) also 
argues that the CAC System is no longer suitable for the current economic condition 
of China. The original motivation of establishing prefecture-level cities is to help 
distribute the resources to different area under a planned economy. However, after the 
economic reform in 1978, the economy of China is gradually being transformed into a 
market economy. Resources are allocated according to the invisible hand instead of 
the governments. So prefecture-level cities have completed their mission in this 
transition process and they have lost their function to allocate resources under the plan. 
As a result, Zhang (2003) suggests that prefecture-level cities should be abolished and 
adopt PAC System. 
There is still an ongoing debate about the effects of PAC System and CAC 
System on economic growth. The major reason why there is a lack of consensus is 
that these previous studies are only descriptive. None of them have done any formal 
and rigorous empirical work to support their arguments. This thesis is a first attempt 
to fill this gap. Regression models will be used to estimate the effect of the PAC 
System on the county economic growth. Hopefully, the empirical results may 
contribute to an objective evaluation of the overall effect of the PAC System on 
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economic growth. 
3.3 Literature on Economic Growth 
As mentioned in the last section, rigorous empirical analyses are very important 
to assessing the effect of the PAC System on economic growth. To be more specific, 
the effect of other factors affecting the growth rate must be held constant before we 
can measure the effect of the PAC System accurately. Our study resorts to the method 
of growth regression and we begin by reviewing the existing literature on economic 
growth. 
With regard to economic growth, the issue of convergence has attracted the 
attention of many economists. That is whether the per capita income of the rich and 
the poor countries will converge over time. Barro (1991) is a pioneering article of 
including initial GDP in regression model to demonstrate the force of conditional 
convergence. In his paper, he examined whether convergence exists among different 
countries and also examined the effect of human capital. By using the cross-sectional 
data of 98 countries from 1960-1985, he built a growth regression model and showed 
that the growth rate of real per capita GDP is negatively related to the initial per capita 
real GDP level in 1960 and positively related to the initial human capital in 1960. In 
this paper, he emphasized the importance of holding other factors constant when 
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examining the existence of convergence. Without holding the initial human capital 
stock, the initial per capita real GDP level would demonstrate insignificant effect on 
the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Moreover, in his model, he also included other 
variables to examine the effect of other factors on growth. He found that an increase 
in government consumption to GDP ratio will lead to a decrease in the economic 
growth rate. Also, political stability can positively affect the growth rate. 
On top of the study of Barro (1991)，other studies continue to modify the 
regression model to study the factors of economic growth. Mankiw et al (1992) focus 
on the effect of saving and population growth on economic growth. It also studied the 
issue of unconditional and conditional convergence. By following Barro's framework 
for empirical study, they eventually reach a conclusion that holding human capital and 
physical capital constant, saving and population growth have positive and negative 
impact on growth respectively. Also, they empirically demonstrate the force of 
conditional convergence after holding population growth and capital accumulation 
constant. These results are not only consistent with the prediction of Solow Model but 
also the conclusion of Barro (1991). 
With regard to the issue of economic growth, there has been having many 
extensions to the approach of estimating the growth regression model. Instead of 
using cross sectional approach by Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al (1992), Islam (1995) 
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advocates using panel data approach to analyze the factors of economic growth and 
convergence. Basing on the Summers-Heston data set of many countries, this study 
takes Mankiw et al (1992) as a starting point and reformulates the regression equation 
used in the study of convergence into a dynamic panel data model and uses panel data 
procedure to estimate it. By taking the advantage of panel data to control the 
unobserved heterogeneity between different countries, omitted variable bias can be 
avoid to certain extent, he empirically demonstrates the existence of conditional 
convergence which is consistent with the Solow Model. He also found that the rate of 
convergence is higher under the panel data approach. 
Based on the framework of these previous studies, according to the survey 
article Temple (1999), studies are trying to include other explanatory variables to 
explore a whole range of factors affecting economic growth?. These factors relate to 
different aspects of economy such as openness and trade, human capital, technology, 
fertility and political economy. With regard to the field of political economy, some 
studies are focusing on the effect of democracy and fiscal system on economic growth. 
Although our study of PAC System can be categorized in the field of political 
economy, our study are distinct from these previous studies by studying the effect of 
administrative system on economic growth. 
7 Read Temple (1999) for the detail of these studies. 
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Recently, Barro and Sala-Martin (2004) include more factors to explain 
economic growth. With the growth rate of real per capita GDP as the dependent 
variable, the different explanatory variables introduced include initial per capita GDP, 
educational attainment, government consumption ratio, openness, investment to GDP 
ratio and other variables. Instead of using primary and secondary school enrollment 
rate, they used the average years of male secondary and higher schooling to measure 
the effect of human capital on the growth rate. Finding a significant negative impact 
of initial per capita GDP, they again confirmed the existence of conditional 
convergence once again. They also found significant positive effect of educational 
attainment, openness and investment to GDP ratio on the growth rate. 
These previous studies are very important to our study not only because they 
provide the general framework for our empirical study but also suggest the important 
factors that our model should include. By following the analytical framework of Barro 
(1991), Barro and Sala-Martin (2004), we will set up regression models to empirically 
test the effect of PAC System on the growth rate of counties. The empirical results 
will be the main contribution of this thesis to the debate on the issue of administrative 
system in China. In the next chapter, we will discuss the details of our research 




This is an empirical study examining the effect of PAC system of Zhejiang on her 
GDP growth rate by means of growth regression. Our empirical analysis is based on 
the data of 116 counties in Zhejiang and Fujian^ for the period 1989 to 2003. We use 
county-level data because the focus of our study is to scrutinize the effect of PAC 
System on the economic growth of counties. This chapter will be divided into two 
parts. The first part will cover the details of our growth regression model and 
approaches while the second part will be the details of the explanatory variables. 
4.1 Growth Regression Model and Approaches 
By pooling the county-level data of Zhejiang and Fujian, we estimate different 
regression models and compare the results in order to check the robustness of our 
estimation results. The general equation of the regression models is as follows: 
P,GDP, + + X + ^ (1) 
k=2 
where k denotes the k"' explanatory variable while K is the total number of 
explanatory variables other than GDP, and PAC. The dependent variable GR is the 
average growth rate of real GDP per capita of the counties in a specific period. GDP, 
8 In the latter part of this chapter, we will discuss the reason for including the data of Fujian in our 
model. 
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is the real GDP per capita of the counties in year t. This variable is introduced as 
initial GDP to capture the effect of convergence, s is the random error term. Since 
the aim of this study is to analyze the effect of PAC System on the economic growth, 
the right hand side variables include many controls in order to isolate the effect of 
PAC System. 
To implement cross-section regression, we are not simply using the data of the 
counties in a particular year. Instead, we follow the method of Barro (1991) and Barro 
and Sala-Martin (2004) to calculate the mean of different variables of each county in 
specific period. For example, we use the data from 1989 to 2003^, we calculate the 
mean of the variables from 1989 to 2003 for each county. Comparing with the method 
of just using the data of particular year to estimate the regression models, the method 
suggested by Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-Martin (2004) will have the advantage 
of utilizing more data for the estimation. We expect that this method can better 
capture the long term effect of PAC System on county economic growth. 
In this study, we use different subgroups including the data of: (1) all counties 
of Zhejiang and Fujian, (2) all counties in Zhejiang including those under Ningbo, (3) 
mountainous counties of Zhejiang and Fujian, (4) non-mountainous counties of 
Zhejiang and Fujian. It is because the specification of Equation (1) actually represents 
9 The data of our study are from Zhejiang Statistical Year Books, Zhejiang Year Books, Fujian 
Statistical Year Books, Fujian Year Books and the prefecture level cities statistical year books of 
Zhejiang and Fujian 
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several assumptions on the intercept term and the coefficients of the right hand side 
variables. Pooling the data is actually assuming that the intercept term a and the 
coefficients /? are the same for all counties and constant over time. Understanding 
these assumptions are important for us to estimate the model because assuming the 
intercept term and coefficients to be the same for the whole sample if they are not is 
equivalent to imposing wrong constraints on the model. This will make the least 
squares estimator biased, no matter how large our sample is. Then the question is: 
which counties are different from the others? For this question, the literature has 
provided some clues to this issue. According to Dai (2000)，there may be differences 
in the responses of the mountainous as opposed to non-mountainous counties to the 
PAC System. If we pool the data of mountainous and non-mountainous counties 
together and assume that they have the same intercept and coefficients, we may risk 
imposing incorrect constraints to our model. To test whether the intercept and 
coefficients are the same for these two groups of counties, the Chow Test is used. The 
test results will be discussed in the chapter on estimation results. To mention it in 
advance, the Chow Test indicates that the intercept and coefficients should be 
different between the mountainous and non-mountainous counties. As a result, one of 
our approaches is to separate our data into mountainous and non-mountainous 
counties and compare the estimation results with that of pooled data, a , and 
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stand for mountainous counties' intercept and coefficients respectively while a^ and 
stand for non-mountainous counties' intercept and coefficients respectively. For 
pooled data, a^ = a^ = a and = = /?. As we will mention later, Zhejiang and 
Fujian may have some unobserved differences and these effects may be captured by 
the PAC dummy. To alleviate this problem is the rationale behind using the sub-
sample including all counties in Zhejiang including those under Ningbo. Since 
Ningbo is the only prefecture-level city in Zhejiang using the CAC System, we can 
just use the counties under Ningbo, which are under the CAC System, to compare 
with the other counties in Zhejiang under PAC System. There may hopefully be less 
unobserved differences between Ningbo，s counties and other Zhejiang prefecture-
level cities' counties since both of these counties are within Zhejiang. This approach, 
to certain extent, may mitigate the problem regarding the appropriateness on using a 
dummy as a proxy for PAC. 
Also, the intercept and coefficients may not be stable and have structural breaks 
over time. That is a , ^ a^ and p, * . So, other than using different sub-groups, we 
will also use sub-periods data to estimate the model. We will use the data from the 
following sub-periods: (1) full data period 1989 - 2003, (2) 1989 - 1993 and 1994 -
2003’ (3) 1989 - 1996 and 1997 - 2003. Table 4.1 provides a general picture about 
our different approaches. Actually, the method of dividing the sample into different 
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sub-periods to check the stability of coefficients over time is quite common in the 
economics literature (For example, Ram (1987), Barro and Martin (2004) p.535). We 
choose 1994 to be the year that divides the full period into two because in 1994, China 
implemented the tax sharing reform and may lead to significant structural changes to 
the data. So we divide the data into two periods to estimate the regression separately 
to examine whether the results are consistent with each other or not. We also choose 
to divide the whole period into two by the year 1997 because using this year would 
lead to more or less the same number of years for the two periods. Also, in 1997, the 
Asian Financial Crisis broke out. Although China did not open her capital account so 
the impact of the crisis was minimized, other Asian countries were seriously affected. 
This may affect the export of China and exert negative impact on China's economic 
growth. There may be a structural break in the data. So we divide the data into two 
periods with 1997 to be the watershed and estimate the regressions separately to check 
the consistency of the results. 
In each period and for each county, we calculate the mean of the variables except 
for the variables GDP, and//C,丨0. For example, for the period 1989 - 2003, we will 
calculate the mean of the real GDP per capita growth rate from 1989 to 2003 for each 
county, the mean of the FDI ratio, investment ratio, and government expenditure ratio 
10 The meaning of the variables will be explained in the next part of this chapter and summarized in 
Table 4.4. 
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of each county from 1989 to 2003 and so on. For the variables GDP, and HC,, we 
will take the value of real GDP per capita level and school enrollment rate of each 
county in 1989 denoted are GDP粉 and/ZC^ respectively. For the period 1994 — 2003, 
we will calculate the mean of the variables of each county from 1994 to 2003. For the 
variables GDP, and HC,, we will take the value of real GDP per capita level and 
school enrollment rate of each county in 1994 this time instead of 1989. The notations 
become GDP^^ a n d / / Q [ 
4.2 Explanatory Variables 
In what follows, we discuss the rationale for including the explanatory variables 
on the right hand side of equation (1). As mentioned in the introduction, in recent 
years, Zhejiang's PAC System is believed to be the engine of Zhejiang counties' rapid 
economic growth. On the other hand, Fujian adopts the CAC System. To study the 
effect of Zhejiang's PAC System on her county economic growth rates, a dummy for 
PAC is introduced. Since Ningbo is the only prefecture-level city in Zhejiang using 
CAC System, the dummy is specified as follows: 
^ . _ fl , counties of Zhejiang except Ningbo 尸AC = < 
0 , counties of Fujian and Ningbo 
Using a dummy variable to capture the effect of PAC System actually has some 
weaknesses. First, the dummy may not be precise enough to solely capture the PAC 
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effect. Since the dummy takes the value 1 for the counties of Zhejiang and 0 for the 
counties of Fujian and Ningbo, the effect of fixed factors that exist in Zhejiang and 
not in Fujian and Ningbo may also be captured by this dummy. We have already tried 
to minimize the effect of other factors by choosing Fujian which has the greatest 
similarity with Zhejiang. Although we are aware of the limitations of the dummy 
variable, it is difficult to find data and continuous variable to measure a political 
institution. We have limited choices and we eventually decide to use a dummy 
variable as a proxy to capture the PAC System. 
As mentioned before, in our study, Fujian is selected for comparison because 
Fujian has a lot of similarities with Zhejiang and yet it has adopted the CAC 
arrangement. Both provinces are located in the coastal region of China. Moreover, 
among the provinces locating in the coastal region, the population size, the size of the 
province, and the average GDP growth rate of Fujian are very similar to Zhejiang. The 
comparison is summarized in Table 4.2 (See Table 1.1，1.2, 1.4 and Figure 1.1 for the 
comparison of the economic growth of Zhejiang and Fujian. See Figure 2.4, 2.5 to 
have overview of geography of Zhejiang and Fujian). 
In Table 4.2, the average population from 1978 to 2003, the size of provinces and 
average GDP growth rate from 1978 to 2003 of the 8 coastal provinces are shown. 
We can see that in terms of average population, Fujian is second close to that of 
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Zhejiang among 8 coastal provinces. For the size of province, Fujian is also second 
close to Zhejiang. For the average GDP growth rate from 1978 to 2003, Fujian is 
closest to Zhejiang among all coastal provinces. From the final column of Table 4.2, 
Fujian is the province most similar to Zhejiang after considering the three criteria 
together. We hope that these similarities can alleviate the possibility of some 
underlying differences between the two provinces that may affect the growth rate and 
yet we may have omitted these differences as controls. We pool Fujian's data with 
those of Zhejiang to examine the effect of the PAC System on the growth rate. 
Although Fujian is similar to Zhejiang, there is also some heterogeneity between 
the two provinces. From Table 4.3，we can see that the amount of investment and 
foreign direct investment are significantly different between the two provinces. From 
1978 to 2003，the average amount of investment in Zhejiang's counties is 1272.89 
million yuan which is more than two fold of that of Fujian. On the other hand, the 
average amount of foreign direct investment in Fujian's counties is 191.15 which is 
also more than two fold of that of Zhejiang. Moreover, the ratio of secondary school 
student to population is also a little bit different between the two provinces. Since 
these factors may probably affect the GDP growth rate of the two provinces, we need 
to control these effects in order to estimate the effect of PAC more accurately. So 
other controlling variables such as investment ratio, FDI ratio are introduced into our 
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regression model. In what follows, we discuss the list of explanatory variables 
included in our regressions. 
Initial GDP Per Capita Level (GDP,). According to the neoclassical growth 
theory such as the Solow model, the country with lower initial GDP per capita will 
grow faster after controlling for the factors affecting the countries' steady state. This is 
called "Conditional Convergence". In the growth regression models of, say, 
BaiTo(1991), Barro & Martin (2004)，initial real GDP per capita is included as a right-
hand-side variable to capture this convergence effect. In their studies, initial real GDP 
per capita is the real GDP per capita pertains to the first year when data are available. 
In our study, our data is from 1989 to 2003 and we will use the data by dividing them 
into different periods of time. If we use the data from 1989 to 2003, then we pick the 
real GDP per capita in 1989 (GDP^g) as the "initial real GDP per capita" to capture 
the convergence effect. Due to the force of convergence, the sign of the coefficient of 
GDP, is expected to be negative. 
Investment Ratio (1). It is the ratio of investment to GDP. In China, investment 
can be regarded as one of the most important sources of economic growth. The 
investment to GDP ratio can be regarded as the saving rate and higher saving will lead 
to a higher steady-state output per effective worker and speed up the economic 
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growth". So investment to GDP ratio may have a positive effect on county economic 
growth. 
Government Expenditure Ratio (GE )• It is the ratio of government expenditure 
to GDP. As we all know, although China is transforming from a planned economy to 
market economy after 1978，the government is still to a large extent playing an 
important role in the economy. Barro (1991) includes government expenditure as one 
of the controlling variables. He found that the ratio of real government consumption 
expenditure to real GDP had a significant negative association with growth. He 
suggests that the reason for this negative effect on economic growth is that 
government consumption lowers saving and growth through the distorting effects 
from taxation or government-expenditure programs. To control this effect on the 
growth rate, we will include the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (GE) in our 
model. 
Foreign Direct Investment Ratio {FDI). It is the foreign direct investment to 
GDP ratio. In recent decades, China's rapid economic growth has attracted 
corporations from around the world. Rapid economic growth provides many golden 
business opportunities for foreign corporations to expand their businesses. Although 
there is capital control in China, there is still substantial foreign direct investment 
11 Barro and Sala-Martin (2004) also suggests that investment ratio should be an important factor 
affecting economic growth. 
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going into Zhejiang's and Fujian's counties. With more foreign direct investment, new 
production technology will also be introduced into the counties and improve the 
productivity of the workers. This will help accelerate the economic growth of the 
counties. So the variable foreign direct investment to GDP ratio {FDI) should also be 
introduced to our model. 
Human Capital (HC, )• There are many studies which included a proxy for 
human capital (Barro (1991), Barro and Martin (2004)，Chen and Feng (2000)，Wang 
and Yao (2003)). They have confirmed the importance of education on growth. Barro 
(1991) uses primary and secondary school enrollment rate in 1960 as a proxy to 
measure the initial stock of human capital for the period 1960 to 1985. The study 
shows that large human capital accumulation can lead to rapid growth of the economy. 
Barro and Martin (2004) used the average years of male secondary and higher 
schooling as a proxy to measure human capital and also get the similar conclusion. 
Chen and Feng (2000) show that education has a positive effect on growth. Instead of 
using primary school enrollment rate, they use higher education enrollment rate as a 
proxy for human capital accumulation because the variation of primary enrollment 
rate is low across provinces in China due to compulsory primary education. Since this 
study will use county-level data, after considering the availability of data, the 
secondary school enrollment rate is used as a proxy to capture the effect of human 
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capital on growth (HC, ) . The school enrollment rate in a particular year t is used 
instead of using the mean of a period because it is introduced to capture the effect of 
initial stock of human capital on growth. For example, if we estimate the model using 
the data from 1989 to 2003, we use the school enrollment rate in 1989 and the 
notation is HC明.With higher school enrollment rate, the economy is expected to 
grow faster, so we expect the sign of this variable will be positive. 
Ratio of Primary Sector Production to GDP {PRIM). There are also some 
other variables which may exert significant impact on the counties' economic growth. 
Primary sector to GDP ratio {PRIM) is one of them. Primary sector includes farming， 
forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery. In China, primary sector 
production still accounts for a large part of GDP especially in some less developed 
counties. The primary sector may negatively affect the growth rate because this sector 
is rather low in productivity when comparing with secondary and tertiary sectors. A 
high primary sector to GDP ratio indicates that the economy of the county is rather 
backward, low productivity and dominated by low value-added production. This may 
adversely affect the growth rate. To capture this effect, the variable of the primary 
sector to GDP ratio is introduced. We expect the sign of the coefficient to be negative. 
The variables mentioned above are summarized in Table 4.4. When we use the 
data to estimate the regression models, we need to test heteroscedasticity by White 
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Test. If heteroscedasticity is detected, heteroscedasticity robust variance estimator 
should be used. 
After discussing the methodology of this study, we will discuss the estimation 




In the last chapter, the details of the methodology are discussed. By using the 
data of Zhejiang and Fujian, several regression models are estimated. The purpose of 
this chapter is to explain and interpret the estimation results. This chapter will be 
divided into two parts. The first part will cover the estimation results. The second part 
will be the summary and interpretation of the major findings. 
5.1 Estimation Results 
As mentioned in the chapter on methodology, we will estimate the regression 
model using the data with respect to different periods and subgroups. For each 
combination of period and subgroup, we will try different combinations of 
independent variables and functional forms to examine whether the results are 
consistent. We first start with the full data set with all the counties of Zhejiang and 
Fujian. 
5.1.1 Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian's counties 
We have used the data of Zhejiang and Fujian's counties in different periods to 
estimate the model, the results are summarized in Table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5. To be 
precise, estimation results for the full period, 1989 - 1993，1994 - 2003, 1989 - 1996， 
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and 1997 - 2003 are presented in these tables respectively. For each period, we have 
tried four different combinations of variables to check the robustness of our 
estimations and we call them Model 1 to 4. Model 1 only includes the dummy PAC 
which is used to measure the effect of PAC System and GDP, which is used to capture 
the force of absolute convergence. Since this model only includes the initial GDP, the 
explanatory power of this model may not be so satisfactory. We treat it as a 
benchmark of the regression results and our focus and interpretation of results will 
largely be based on the other models. Model 2 includes other controlling variables 
HC,, PRIM and GE. An interacting term between PAC and GE is added. Investment 
ratio and FDI ratio are added in Model 3 while square of GDP, and square of GE are 
added in Model 4. With regard to the estimation in each case, we use the White Test to 
test for heteroscedasticity. If this problem is detected, heteroscedasticity robust 
variance estimator is used. 
In all these models using different periods of data to calculate the means of the 
variables, coefficients of variables are by and large having the same sign and 
magnitude. With regard to the focus of our study, the dummy PAC, it is significant in 
most of the cases with a negative coefficient except for the period 1989 to 1993. 
This estimation result indicates that the PAC System is having a negative effect on the 
12 One possible explanation for the insignificance in the period 1989 to 1993 is due to using too short 
time period of data to calculate the means for estimations. This may results in not enough variation in 
the data. 
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counties' economic growth comparing with CAC. With regard to the magnitude, the 
values of the coefficient are about 5 to 6 on average. This suggests that the real GDP 
per capita growth rate of the counties will be lowered by the PAC System by 5 to 6% 
comparing with other administrative system. This magnitude of deduction is actually 
quite substantial. 
Next, we will discuss how other factors affect the dependent variable. The 
coefficient of GDP, is negative and significant in most of the models in Table 5.1 to 
Table 5.5. This means that there is conditional convergence in the counties of 
Zhejiang and Fujian. Moreover, in Model 4 of these tables, the coefficient of the 
square term of GDP, is significant and positive in some cases indicating the non-
linear pace of convergence between the counties. 
GE is highly significant in Model 2’ 3, and 4 in Table 5.1 to 5.5 with negative 
coefficient. This means that larger share of government expenditure in the economy 
will hinder the economic growth. The magnitude is about 1 which means that 1% 
increase of the government share in the GDP will lead to approximately 1% decrease 
in economic growth. With regard to GE，we have found that the interacting term 
between GE and PAC is usually significant with a positive coefficient in Model 2，3 
and 4 of Table 5.1 to 5.5. The magnitude is around 0.7. This interacting term can be 
regarded as a slope dummy for GE xhis indicates that for the counties under PAC 
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System (that is PAC = 1)，the negative effect of GE partially offset by the positive 
coefficient of the interacting term. In the PAC counties, 1% increase of government 
share in the GDP will only lead to approximate 0.3% of growth reduction. 
With regard to other controlling variables, they are by and large statistically 
significant. For the Model 3 and 4 of Table 5.1 to 5.5, FDI and 7 are usually 
significant with a positive coefficient indicating that these two kinds of investment are 
conducive to economic growth. Furthermore, for the models including PRIM， 
coefficients of PRIM are all negative and highly significant. This shows that primary 
share in the economy impedes economic growth. 
5.1.2 Using Data of counties of Zhejiang and Ningbo'^ 
As mentioned before, the dummy PAC may also capture some unobserved 
heterogeneity between Zhejiang and Fujian which will make the dummy a poor proxy. 
Excluding the counties of Fujian and only using the data of counties under Ningbo 
and counties under other Zhejiang's prefecture-level cities may be able to alleviate the 
problem because there may be less underlying differences between counties under 
Ningbo and other prefecture-level cities of Zhejiang. The aim of using this approach 
13 Just to remind us that Zhejiang has 11 prefecture-level cities. Ningbo is the only prefecture-level city 
in Zhejiang implementing CAC System and administering subordinate counties. Other prefecture-level 
cities in Zhejiang arc under PAC System and not responsible for administering subordinate counties. As 
a result, we can use the counties under Ningbo to compare with other counties within Zhejiang to 
examine the effect of PAC System. 
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is to check the robustness and consistency of our estimations we obtained before. 
As we have done before, we divide the data into different periods to calculate the 
mean of the variables: full period, 1989 to 1993, 1994 to 2003, 1989 to 1996, and 
1997 to 2003. The estimation results are summarized in Table 5.6 to 5.10. Since it 
may be too tedious to discuss the results in detail, we will only briefly describe the 
results and the interpretations are more or less the same as last part. 
To glance through the Table 5.6 to 5.10, the coefficients of the variables are more 
or less the same as in the last part. On the one hand, the coefficient of PAC is negative 
and highly significant in some of the models. On the other hand, PAC is sometimes 
insignificant. The interacting term PACX 玩 fails to demonstrate a significant 
coefficient. This may be due to the decrease in the sample size after excluding the data 
of Fujian，s counties. 
With regard to other controlling variables, GDP, is still having significant 
negative coefficient in most of models indicating the force of convergence. GE and 
PRIM are still having negative coefficient but only significant in some of the models. 
FDI and 7 only have few significant coefficients in the models. Smaller sample size 
is one of the possible explanations for these insignificant results. 
5.1.3 Using Data of Mountainous and Non-Mountainous counties of 
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Zhejiang and Fujian 
As mentioned in the chapter on methodology, pooling the data of Zhejiang's and 
Fujian，s counties together to estimate the regression model implies an assumption that 
all counties are sharing the same intercept and coefficients. There may be significant 
differences in economic structure between mountainous and non-mountainous 
counties. According to Dai (2000), the effect of PAC System for the mountainous 
counties may be even worse. So we use the Chow Test to test whether the assumption 
is valid. For the Chow Test, the null hypothesis is that there is no significant 
difference between the two groups. To implement the test, we added a dummy 
variable for the mountainous counties and interacting terms between the dummy and 
all other independent variables. Then we jointly test the significance of the dummy 
variable and the interacting terms coefficients using an F-test. We found that the test 
statistics is 2.26 with a p-value 0.0199. The test is significant at 5% level and this 
rejects the null hypothesis. So we separately use the mountainous and non-
mountainous counties to estimate the regression model. Since Ningbo does not have 
mountainous counties, we will only use the data of mountainous counties of Zhejiang 
and Fujian. 
Again, to avoid tedious explanations, we will only describe the results briefly 
and the results are summarized in Table 5.11 to 5.20. The motivation of having all 
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these different approaches is to compare the results thoroughly in order to ensure our 
estimation results are robust and consistent with each others. 
From Table 5.11 to 5.20, over half of the PAC coefficients are significant with 
negative coefficients. Also, the interacting term PACX^ is significant with positive 
coefficient in some cases. These are consistent with what we have obtained. The 
initial GDP again has a negative sign and demonstrates a significant force of 
convergence. GE and PRIM are having significant negative sign in some models of 
both mountainous and non-mountainous counties. Only a few of FDI and 7 are 
showing significant positive coefficients in these models. Especially for mountainous 
counties, FDI is showing insignificant effect on economic growth. This shows the 
economic structure of mountainous counties may not be suitable for foreign direct 
investment and the economic structure of these counties cannot transform foreign 
direct investment into the force of economic growth. 
5.2 Summary and Interpretation of Estimation Results 
In this section, we will summarize our findings and provide interpretations for 
them. Table 5.21 provides general picture of our estimation results. The results seem 
to suggest that the PAC System is having a negative effect on the counties' economic 
growth comparing with other administrative system after controlling other factors. 
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These results are quite robust and highly consistent with each others. 
However, in the chapter on literature review, we have mentioned that there are 
many studies (e.g. Hu (2004), Wu (2004), Zhu (2003)) suggesting that the Province-
Administering-County System can significantly improve the structure and 
relationships of local governments. They also believe that the PAC System is the 
engine of growth of Zhejiang. Since our results contradict these previous studies, in 
what follows, an explanation of our empirical finding is required. The negative effect 
of PAC may be due to the following reasons: 
I. Under the PAC System of Zhejiang, the provincial government is responsible 
for the fiscal and personnel arrangement of county-level governments. In Zhejiang, 
there are a total of 58 counties (including county level cities) that the provincial 
government has to manage. According to Sheng-fa-gai-wei (2005), it is probable that 
the provincial government is overstretched in managing so many counties. Local 
needs of the counties cannot be observed by the officials of provincial government 
promptly. This may lead to policy lags, improper policies, finally hindering economic 
growth. 
II. According to Zhang (2004)，there is also the problem of duplication of 
infrastructure and inefficient allocation of resources. Under the PAC System, the 
counties are no longer managed by the prefecture-level cities, so the development 
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policies of counties and prefecture-level cities government are not coordinated, 
resulting in the duplication of infrastructure and thereby wasting resources. Actually, 
these infrastmctural facilities help exploit economies of scale by serving more 
jurisdictions. This inefficiency under PAC System may also be one of the causes of 
PAC's negative effect on economic growth. 
III. In our regression models, we used a dummy variable to capture the effect of the 
PAC System. Although we have tried to include as many controlling variables as 
possible to isolate the effect of PAC System, it is possible that there are still omitted 
factors which may affect the economic growth. These unobserved factors may be one 
of the causes of the negative effect of PAC System shown in the estimation results. 
Fortunately, the estimation results from using full sample and that of using data of 
Zhejiang and Ningbo are highly consistent with each other. This may increase our 
confidence to assert that the dummy variable PAC is not seriously affected by other 
unobserved factors and it should be by and large capturing the effect of PAC System. 
Other than the estimated coefficient of PAC, our estimation results also seem to 
suggest that government expenditure hinders economic growth. Higher government 
expenditure to GDP ratio indicates the government is having a larger role in allocating 
resources. As often suggested by mainstream economists, the government's visible 
hand is not as efficient as the market in allocating resources and the former will lead 
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to market distortion and inefficient resource allocation. Our results question the role 
of the government in promoting economic growth and downsizing the government 
may help minimize its negative effect on economic growth. 
Our results derived from the model indicate that the interacting term between 
PAC and government expenditure ratio {GE) has a significant positive coefficient. 
This positive coefficient indicates that the negative impact of government expenditure 
is partly offset by the PAC System. A possible explanation is that, for those counties 
under PAC System, their governments have larger authority to determine the use of 
public funds because county-level governments are no longer under the prefecture-
level cities. Since they have more information about the situation and market 
condition of the counties, they know more about the local needs of the counties than 
the prefecture-level city government, so the government expenditure of PAC counties 
will be more efficient and cause less market distortion. The interacting variable is 
probably capturing the positive effect of the PAC System. However, the negative 
impact of government expenditure is only partly offset by the positive coefficient of 
the interacting term. The magnitude of the interacting term is not strong enough to 
reverse around the negative effect of government expenditure. 
From our discussion so far, there are several potential advantages and 
disadvantages of the PAC System. Although the estimation results show that the PAC 
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System may have negative impact on economic growth, it may not be appropriate to 
assert that the PAC System is inferior to the CAC System in promoting economic 
growth since we only selected Zhejiang and Fujian to examine the PAC System. A 
definite conclusion may not be drawn before conducting further studies on the PAC 
System. In the next chapter, policy implications from this finding and a conclusion 
will be given. 
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Chapter 6 
Policy Implications and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we will first have a brief summary of our major findings that 
are pertinent to the effect of PAC system on economic growth. Since the system of 
administrative hierarchy is an important issue that may affect the whole country in 
many different ways ranging from economic growth to political stability, we will draw 
policy implications from our empirical findings. Finally, we will discuss the limitation 
of this study and possible ways to extend this study. 
6.1 Summary of Major Findings 
As shown in the chapter on methodology and estimation results, we adopt the 
analytical framework of economic growth pioneered by BaiTo(1991). Growth 
regressions are used to examine the effect of the PAC System on the counties' 
economic growth. After considering the situation in China and factors included in 
previous studies, several controlling variables such as investment ratio and primary 
sector production ratio are introduced to the growth regressions. Also, a dummy 
variable PAC is introduced to capture the effect of the PAC System. By using the data 
of county in Zhejiang and Fujian, the growth regression models are estimated to 
examine the effect of the PAC System. 
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Our empirical findings show that the dummy variable PAC is consistently 
having negative signs. This result suggests that, relative to the CAC System, the PAC 
System has a negative effect on the counties' economic growth. It rejects the 
hypothesis that the PAC System exerts positive impact on economic growth. These 
empirical results cast doubt on the view that prefecture-level cities may actually have 
a role in promoting their subordinate counties' economic growth. The CAC System 
should not be easily dismissed without conducting more studies on this issue. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
One of the goals of the ll"^ Five Year Plan of China''*is to reform the sub-
provincial fiscal system and administrative hierarchy. The plan also explicitly 
mentioned that "some provinces with suitable conditions can implement PAC System". 
It is clearly that the intention of the central government is to promote PAC System. 
The llth Five Year Plan, to a certain extent, has further stimulated the debate on 
whether the PAC System is better than the CAC System. Also the focus of the debate 
is whether the PAC System should be adopted by all provinces of China. This study 
may contribute to this debate by drawing policy implications from the empirical 
findings. 
14 The detail of the 11出 Five Year Plan can be found in Zhongguo Wang [China Webpage] 
(http://www.china.org.en/chinese/2006/Mar/l 156685.htm) 
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Notwithstanding the political decision of the central government and its 
determination to push PAC throughout the whole country, the debate about the system 
of administrative jurisdictions has not reached a consensus. On one hand, the main 
argument of the former is that under PAC System, transfer payments from provincial 
governments can be transferred entirely to the counties to help them solve fiscal 
deficit without being siphoned off by prefecture-level cities. However, this potential 
advantage is based on the assumption that provincial governments have larger 
incentive to help subordinate counties maintain fiscal balance than prefecture-level 
cities do. There is no hard evidence to support this conjecture. It is also difficult to 
explain why provincial governments would not have incentive to siphon off fiscal 
resources from the counties under PAC System. Furthermore, even if provincial 
governments are not predatory and counties can obtain more fiscal resources for 
government expenditure, our estimation results suggest that larger government 
expenditure will lead to more serious distortion of economy and lower the economic 
growth. So this argument for PAC System may not be valid. 
On the other hand, other studies (e.g. Wang (2004)) point out that the 
administrative burden and administrative costs of provincial government are higher 
under PAC System because prefecture-level cities are not responsible for managing 
the counties. These studies tend to disapprove of PAC and support CAC instead. 
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Our empirical results seem to be in favor of the CAC System. The negative sign 
of the dummy variable PAC indicates that the PAC System may have negative impact 
on counties' economic growth relative to the CAC System. From these results, the 
most salient policy implication is that the CAC System may have its merits under 
certain circumstances and it may be too rash for all provinces to switch to CAC. The 
11 th Five Year Plan has set the goal of implementing the PAC System, the PAC 
System will probably become the major mode of administrative system in the future. 
With regard to the method of implementing the administrative reform, we would like 
to suggest that instead of having a big bang, PAC System should be implemented 
gradually to replace CAC System in different provinces. For example, the central 
government can first of all implement PAC System to the counties currently managing 
by some less developed prefecture-level cities. Also, the central government should 
carefully examine the suitability of implementing PAC System on a particular 
province in order to minimize the shock of the administrative changes to the province. 
PAC System may co-exist with CAC System within a province at the beginning of the 
reform to compare the different results. Also, the negative effect of PAC System may 
be larger for some physically large provinces such as Xinjiang and Neimenggu 
because of the poor transportation and communication infrastructure. Poor 
transportation network in large provinces may amplify the difficulty of the province to 
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administer counties. So the government should pay special attention when PAC is 
implemented in these large provinces. For example, some investment projects on 
transportation and communication infrastructure should be implemented together with 
the PAC System reform to mitigate the administrative burden of the provincial 
government. 
As far as the promotion of economic growth is concerned, administrative reform 
is only one among the many factors. As shown in the estimation results of our 
regression models, other factors are also having significant impact on the economic 
growth. For example, investment and foreign direct investment are having significant 
positive impact on economic growth. So improving the basic infrastructure of the 
economy to attract more investment is also important for promoting counties' 
economic growth. Our regression models also show that more government 
expenditure will lead to lower economic growth. So downsizing the county 
governments, eliminating unnecessary expenditure would be as important as, or at 
least not less important than implementing administrative reform to promote counties' 
economic growth. Furthermore，our empirical findings indicate that the larger the 
primary sector production to GDP ratio is, the slower the economic growth will be. It 
is because the production of the primary sector is low relative to the secondary and 
tertiary sectors. So promoting the development of secondary and tertiary industry by 
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attracting more investment may also be a very important way of promoting economic 
growth. 
6.3 Limitation and Possible Extensions 
After discussing the policy implications of our empirical findings, we will 
discuss the limitation of our study and some possible extensions. As discussed in the 
section on methodology, a dummy variable used to capture the effect of the PAC 
System on economic growth. Many controlling variables are introduced to isolate the 
effect of the PAC System. However, it is possible that there may still be factors which 
affect economic growth but are not included in our model. Effects of these factors 
may also be captured by the PAC dummy. This limitation may, to certain extent, affect 
the accuracy in estimating the effect of the PAC System. Finding another proxy for 
PAC System is worth exploring in future works on PAC. 
As mentioned before, situations of different provinces in China may be quite 
different in terms of the size of province, geographical location, culture, historical 
background, etc. It may also be interesting to apply the empirical framework of this 
study to other provinces and compare the results with this study. 
Other than applying the framework used in this thesis to other provinces, it may 
also be fruitful to extend this study by using more recent data in the future because, 
63 
being a developing country, China's economic and social environment are 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2 Real GDP Per Capita Growth Rate of China, Zhejiang and 
Fujian 
^ Real GDP Per Capita Real GDP Per Capita Real GDP Per Capita 
Growth Rate of China Growth Rate of Zhejiang Growth Rate of Fujian 
^ 112 19 
1980 6.5 14.97 17.2 
1981 3.9 10.39 14 
1982 7.5 10.04 7.5 
1983 9.3 6.89 4.4 
1984 13.7 20.59 16.3 
1985 11.9 20.64 14.9 
1986 7.2 11.04 4.5 
1987 9.8 10.57 11.8 
1988 9.5 9.89 12.6 
1989 2.5 -1.55 6.1 
1990 2.3 3.12 4.7 
1991 7.7 17.11 11.4 
1992 12.8 18.32 19 
1993 12.2 21.28 22.6 
1994 11.4 19.2 20.2 
1995 9.3 15.91 13.9 
1996 8.4 12.19 12.4 
1997 7.7 10.43 13.3 
1998 6.8 9.6 10.3 
1999 6.2 9.4 9.2 
2000 7.1 10.3 6.5 
2001 6.7 8.8 7 
2002 7.6 11.8 9.6 
2003 8.7 13.6 10.9 
Average 8.112 12.2692 11.368 
Source: Statistical Year Book of China 2004, Statistical Year Book of Zhejiang 2004, Statistical Year 
Book of Fujian 2004 
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Table 1.3 Counties' Average Growth Rate of Real GDP Per 
Capita in Zhejiang and Fujian from 1990 - 2003 
Year Zhejiang Fujian 
4.937822" 3.81565 
1991 15.23356 10.01184 
1992 19.00713 20.48653 
1993 25.21692 28.95565 
1994 19.87401 24.34251 
1995 17.06356 21.49917 
1996 16.50435 18.83199 
1997 8.570682 16.01376 
1998 9.901451 12.08702 
1999 10.75555 9.759752 
2000 11.65172 9.368804 
2001 12.35322 8.139923 
2002 13.18714 9.176433 
2003 15.30174 11.16206 
Mean 14.2542'^ 14.54651 
Note: 
1. These data are calculated from the data of statistics yearbooks of Zhejiang and Fujian 
15 It is the average of the real GDP per capita growth rate of 58 counties in Zhejiang in 1990. 
16 It is the mean of the real GDP per capita growth rate of 58 counties in Zhejiang from 1990-2003. 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Administration System of 
China since 1949 
Year Province Municipality Prefecture Prefecture County County 
Jurisdiction Level City Level City 
1949 30 12 185 54 2068 66 
1950 29 13 N.A. 64 N.A. 65 
1951 29 13 193 69 2082 73 
1952 29 12 187 67 1941 72 
1953 30 3 152 75 1941 73 
1954 25 3 151 82 1998 80 
1955 26 3 151 83 2003 78 
1956 23 3 140 88 2020 83 
1957 23 3 140 92 2026 81 
1958 22 2 121 68 1682 114 
1959 22 2 119 75 1624 102 
1960 22 2 116 88 1649 109 
1961 22 2 135 80 1888 126 
1962 22 2 148 81 2017 111 
1963 22 2 151 78 2042 97 
1964 22 2 146 75 1981 90 
1965 22 2 168 76 2070 90 
1966 N.A. 2 N.A. 79 N.A. 90 
1967 N.A. 3 N.A. 79 N.A. 90 
1968 N.A. 3 N.A. 79 N.A. 90 
1969 N.A. 3 N.A. 80 N.A. 93 
1970 22 3 174 79 2073 95 
1971 22 3 172 82 2077 96 
1972 22 3 174 82 2077 97 
1973 22 3 174 83 2078 95 
1974 22 3 174 87 2078 91 
1975 N A 3 N.A. 96 N.A, 86 
1976 22 ' 3 174 96 2079 89 
1977 22 3 175 97 2075 90 
1978 22 3 173 98 2076 92 
1979 22 3 171 104 2072 109 
1980 22 3 170 107 2070 113 
1981 22 3 168 108 2070 122 
1982 22 3 170 112 2067 130 
1983 22 3 138 144 2017 142 
1984 22 3 135 148 2006 149 
1985 22 3 125 162 1986 159 
1986 22 3 119 166 1957 184 
1987 22 3 117 170 1927 208 
1988 23 3 113 183 1877 248 
1989 N.A. 3 N.A. 185 N.A. 262 
1990 23 3 113 185 1844 279 
1991 23 3 113 187 1835 289 
1992 N.A. 3 N.A. 191 N.A. 323 
199 3 23 3 m 196 ]2IL 
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1994 23 3 89 206 1679 413 
1995 23 3 86 210 1660 427 
1996 N.A. 3 N.A. 218 N.A. 445 
1997 N.A. 4 N.A. 222 N.A. 442 
1998 23 4 66 227 1633 437 
1999 23 4 58 236 1627 427 
2000 23 4 37 259 1619 400 
2001 23 4 32 265 1605 393 
2002 23 4 22 275 1594 381 
2003 23 4 18 282 1587 374 
2004 23 4 17 283 1581 374 
200 5 ^ 4 n ^ 374 
Note: 
1. Source: Xingzheng Quhua Wang littD;/Avvvw.xzah.org/iiidcx.htni and Dai (2000) p. 258-261 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of Administration System of 
Zhejiang since 1949 
Year Prefecture Prefecture Level County County Level City 
Jurisdiction City 
— 1949 10 3 78 6 
1950 9 3 77 3 
1951 9 3 77 4 
1952 7 4 77 3 
1953 7 7 81 0 
1954 6 7 81 0 
1955 6 7 81 0 
1956 6 7 81 0 
1957 7 7 81 0 
1958 5 3 51 4 
1959 5 3 51 4 
1960 4 3 45 4 
1961 4 3 54 4 
1962 6 3 63 0 
1963 7 3 63 0 
1964 8 3 63 0 
1965 7 3 63 0 
1966 8 3 64 0 
1967 8 3 64 0 
1968 8 3 64 0 
1969 8 3 64 0 
1970 8 3 64 0 
1971 8 3 64 0 
1972 8 3 64 0 
1973 8 3 65 0 
1974 8 3 65 0 
1975 8 3 65 0 
1976 8 3 65 0 
1977 8 3 65 0 
1978 8 3 65 0 
1979 8 3 65 5 
1980 8 3 65 5 
1981 7 3 62 6 
1982 7 3 63 6 
1983 4 6 66 3 
1984 4 6 67 3 
1985 3 8 66 3 
1986 3 8 63 6 
1987 2 9 58 9 
1988 2 9 54 13 
1989 2 9 52 15 
1990 2 9 51 16 
1991 2 9 50 17 
199 2 2 9 ^ 20 
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1993 2 9 44 22 
1994 1 10 41 23 
1995 1 10 40 24 
1996 1 10 39 25 
1997 1 10 39 25 
1998 1 10 39 25 
1999 1 10 39 25 
2000 0 11 38 24 
2001 0 11 37 22 
2002 0 11 36 22 
2003 0 11 36 22 
2004 0 11 36 22 
2005 0 11 36 22 
Note: 
1. Source: Xingzheng Quhua Wang ht tD: / /www.xza l i . org /vange /33z i7 i i idex .h tm 
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics of Administration System of Fujian 
since 1949 
Year Prefecture Level County County Level City 
C^ 
1949 2 67 0 
1950 2 67 2 
1951 2 67 2 
1952 2 67 2 
1953 2 67 2 
1954 2 67 2 
1955 2 67 2 
1956 2 63 3 
1957 2 63 3 
1958 2 63 3 
1959 2 63 3 
1960 3 59 3 
1961 3 61 3 
1962 3 62 3 
1963 2 62 4 
1964 2 63 4 
1965 2 63 4 
1966 2 63 4 
1967 2 63 4 
1968 2 63 4 
1969 2 63 4 
1970 2 60 4 
1971 2 60 4 
1972 2 60 4 
1973 2 60 4 
1974 2 62 4 
1975 2 62 4 
1976 2 62 4 
1977 2 62 4 
1978 2 62 4 
1979 2 62 4 
1980 2 62 4 
1981 2 61 5 
1982 2 61 5 
1983 4 60 5 
1984 4 59 6 
1985 6 59 4 
1986 6 59 4 
1987 6 59 5 
1988 6 58 6 
1989 6 56 8 
1990 6 54 10 
1991 6 54 10 
\992 6 _ 5 2 12 
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1993 6 50 14 
1994 7 48 15 
1995 7 47 16 
1996 8 46 15 
1997 8 46 15 
1998 8 46 15 
1999 9 46 14 
2000 9 46 14 
2001 9 46 14 
2002 9 45 14 
2003 9 45 14 
2004 9 45 14 
200 5 9 ^ 14 
Note: 
1 • Source: Xingzheng Quhua Wang h t tp: / /www .xzqh.org/vange/35fi / index.ht in 
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Table 4.1 Overview of Different Approaches of Estimation 
1989- 1989- 1994- 1989- 1997-
2003 1993 2003 1996 2003 
Counties of: Number of Observations 
Zh:jiangVs 116 116 116 116 
Fujian 
Z h ^ ^ n g V s 58 58 58 58 
Ningbo 
Zhejiang Vs 




二 jian(Non- ^^ 45 45 45 45 
Mountainous 
Counties) 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3 Economic Indicators of Zhejiang and Fujian's Counties 
from 1989 to 2003 
Economic Indicators County of Zhejiang County of Fujian 
Average Growth Rate of Real GDP Per 2542 15 54651 
Capita 
Average Investment (million yuan) 1272.89 527.81 
Average Foreign Direct Investment 72 94 191 15 
(million yuan) 
Average primary sector production 仍6 g^  651 72 
(million yuan) 
Average government expenditure to . r q^ 
GDP ratio (%) 
Average secondary school student to ^ ^ ^ ^ 5了 
population ratio (%) J ‘ 
Note: 
1 • Foreign direct investment is converted to yuan by using official exchange rate of each year. 
2. These indicators are calculated from the data of Zhejiang Statistical Year Books, Zhejiang 
Year Books, Fujian Statistical Year Books, Fujian Year Books and the prefecture level cities 
statistical year books of Zhejiang and Fujian 
77 
Table 4.4 Definitions of the Variables 
Variables Definition 
GR Average real GDP per capita growth rate 
GDP, Real GDP per capita level in year t 
GDP? Square of Real GDP per capita level in year t 
H c Secondary-school enrollment rate which is the ratio of 
‘ secondary school students to total population in year t 
PRIM Average ratio of value of primary sector production to GDP 
GE Average ratio of government expenditure to GDP 
{GEf Square of OT 
FDI Average ratio of total value of foreign capital utilized to GDP. 
7 Average ratio of total investment in fixed assets to GDP 
p^^ Dummy variable for counties under Province-Administering-
County System 
PACxGE Interacting term ofP^Cand ^ 
Note: 
1. The data obtained from Zhejiang Statistical Year Books, Zhejiang Year Books, Fujian 
Statistical Year Books, Fujian Year Books and the prefecture level cities statistical year books of 
Zhejiang and Fujian 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -0.864 -6.609*** -5.004*** -3.937*** 
(0.774) (1.329) (1.273) (1.301) 
P A C x ^ 0.745*** 0.576*** 0.426** 
(0.168) (0.164) (0.172) 
GDP粉 -0.0002 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.007*** 
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.002) 
GDP^ ' 0.0000012** 
0.00000007 
//Q, -1.085*** -0.879*** -0.589** 
(0.273) (0.247) (0.263) 
p r i m -0.183*** -0.153*** -0.127*** 
(0.032) (0.026) (0.027) 
^ -1.027*** -0.953*** -1.558*** 
(0.153) (0.155) (0.352) 
(函2 0.034* 
(0.019) 
J o j 0.154*** 0.183*** 
(0.054) (0.055) 
7 0.093*** 0.089*** 
(0.027) (0.026) 
Constant 15.005*** 35.365*** 30.573*** 33.956*** 
(1.012) (2.233) (1.843) (2.176) 
No. of observations 116 116 116 116 
Adjusted R-squared -0.006 0.6294 0.6932 0.7085 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.1924 p-value = 0.002 p-value = 0.1071 p-value = 0.2564 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.4852 p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0003 p-value = 0.0028 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
" W i a b l e s Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -0.456 -4.674 0.509 1.454 
(1.463) (3.508) (2.899) (2.741) 
P A C x ' ^ 0.468 0.133 -0.001 
(0.342) (0.279) (0.272) 
GDP,, -0.0004 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
GDP,,' 0.00000250** 
(0.0000011) 
HC糾 -2.134*** -1.327** -0.868 
(0.762) (0.608) (0.613) 
W J m -0.256** -0.139** -0.113** 
(0.099) (0.057) (0.054) 
^ -0.851*** -0.741*** -1.670** 





7 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 16.695*** 48.746*** 36.446*** 44.754*** 
(1.912) (8.320) (7.103) (8.339) 
No. of observations 116 116 116 116 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0158 0.2464 0.5393 0.5510 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.6978 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.0004 p-value = 0.0040 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.8480 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.001 p-value = 0.0112 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -1.029 -7.680*** -8.740*** -7.825*** 
(0.697) (1.330) (1.916) (1.830) 
PACXGE 0.926*** 0.923*** 0.722*** 
(0.209) (0.219) (0.219) 
GDP,, 0.0005** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
(0.0002) (-0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP,,' 3.93e-08 
(4.31e-08) 
HC似 -0.595 -0.545 -0.294 
(0.409) (0.429) (0.418) 
-0.148*** -0.141*** -0.115*** 
(0.032) (0.036) (0.035) 
^ -1.252*** -1.325*** -2.117*** 
(0.210) (0.227) (0.377) 
( 淀 0 . 0 5 0 * * * 
(0.017) 
J ^ l -0.003 -0.031 
(0.069) (0.074) 
7 0.119*** 0.136*** 
(0.039) (0.047) 
Constant 12.792*** 30.312*** 28.364*** 29.863*** 
(0.764) (2.356) (3.305) (3.642) 
No. of observations 116 116 116 116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0503 0.5086 0.5395 0.5524 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.4265 p-value = 0.2987 p-value = 0.0657 p-value = 0.0366 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.0934 p-value = 0.0044 p-value = 0.0121 p-value = 0.0107 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -2.388** -8.297*** -4.317* -3.405 
(1-198) (2.626) (2.191) (2.129) 
P A C x ^ 0.628** 0.398 0.255 
(0.300) (0.257) (0.248) 
GDP糾 -0.0005 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
GDP:- 2.12e-06** 
(8.91e-07) 
-1.524*** -0.991** -0.561 
(0.491) (0.441) (0.443) 
PRIM -0.254*** -0.163*** -0.132*** 
(0.068) (0.047) (0.044) 
^ -1.228*** -1.187*** -2.210*** 
(0.268) (0.228) (0.623) 
(面: 0.052 
(0.032) 
FDI 0.395*** 0.432*** 
(0.048) (0.051) 
7 0.035 0.034 
(0.028) (0.026) 
Constant 19.274*** 50.231*** 41.024*** 47.917*** 
(1.565) (5.188) (4.662) (5.445) 
No. of observations 116 116 116 116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0207 0.4868 0.6361 0.6520 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.5346 p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0044 p-value = 0.0253 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.9134 p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0024 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC 0.846 -4.501*** -5.562*** -4.694*** 
(0.582) (1.407) (1.528) (1.596) 
PAC^GE 0.759*** 0.772*** 0.640*** 
(0.192) (0.190) (0.211) 
GDP们 0.0003*** -0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0001 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
GDP,,' -1.66e-08 
(1.08e-08) 
0.258 0.476 0.605* 
(0.301) (0.304) (0.311) 
PRIM -0.110*** -0.100*** -0.088*** 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
^ -0.901*** -1.011*** -1.324*** 
(0.196) (0.197) (0.299) 
i ^ y 0.025* 
(0.013) 
FDI -0.036 -0.046 
(0.082) (0.060) 
7 0.117*** 0.109*** 
(0.036) (0.033) 
Constant 9.485*** 18.639*** 15.631*** 14.589*** 
(0.632) (2.884) (3.086) (3.079) 
No. of observations 116 116 116 116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0643 0.3578 0.4039 0.4182 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.4378 p-value = 0.2425 p-value = 0.1858 p-value = 0.0234 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.1007 p-value = 0.3616 p-value = 0.2320 p-value = 0.6484 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -3.479** -3.127*** -2.897** -0.807 
(1.490) (1.134) (1.240) (6.602) 
PACx^ -0.611 
(1.297) 
GDP,, 0.0009 -0.002** -0.002*** -0.011*** 
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
GDP,,' 0.000002** 
(0.00001) 
HC糾 -0.668** -0.468 -0.019 
(0.329) (0.351) (0.378) 
p M ^ -0.093** -0.088** -0.035 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.043) 
淀 -0.401*** -0.489*** -1.128 
(0.137) (0.142) (1.386) 
(GE)' 0.054** 
(0.023) 
FDI 0.290 0.047 
(0.493) (0.501) 
7 0.126* 0.078 
(0.070) (0.071) 
Constant 16.102*** 27.219*** 24.261*** 31.700*** 
(1.957) (2.540) (2.976) (7.713) 
No. of observations 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1040 0.4827 0.5020 0.5541 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.1241 p-value = 0.7781 p-value = 0.4161 p-value = 0.3836 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.9954 p-value = 0.0071 p-value = 0.1027 p-value = 0.2329 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -5.059* 2.482 5.122 6.097 
(2.853) (16.853) (17.430) (16.820) 
P A C x ^ -1.288 -1.738 -2.072 
(3.357) (3.443) (3.326) 
GDP讲 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005** -0.023** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
GDP,,' 0.00000513* 
(0.00000268) 
HC明 -1.350* -1.497* -0.616 
(0.748) (0.794) (0.856) 
PRIM -0.060 -0.076 -0.051 
(0.063) (0.066) (0.067) 
^ 0.445 0.902 -0.943 
(3.395) (3.476) (3.539) 
(gE)' 0.0859 
(0.052) 
FDJ 0.562 0.248 
(1.060) (1.071) 
7 -0.105 -0.144 
(0.145) (0.141) 
Constant 21.492*** 35.565** 35.591* 55.422*** 
(3.747) (17.434) (17.958) (19.205) 
No. of observations 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0197 0.2169 0.1981 0.2546 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.2558 p-value = 0.3815 p-value = 0.5496 p-value = 0.2114 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.9883 p-value = 0.0101 p-value = 0.0707 p-value = 0.0292 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -1.384 -2.455* -3.832 -9.709 
(1.404) (1.341) (6.929) (7.489) 
P A C x ^ 0.376 1.358 
(1.356) (1.462) 
GDP训 0.0009*** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.002 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.002) 
GDP,,' -3.55e-07 
(2.17e-07) 
HC躲 -0.121 0.306 0.431 
(0.512) (0.558) (0.550) 
TRIM -0.078 -0.070 -0.072 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.058) 
^ -0.268* -0.673 -2.112 
(0.150) (1.366) (1.451) 
( ^ y 0.031 
(0.025) 
J o i 0.644 0.537 
(0.390) (0.382) 
7 0.056 0.081 
(0.057) (0.056) 
Constant 11.851*** 18.935*** 16.960** 19.065** 
(1.838) (3.912) (7.689) (7.562) 
No. of observations 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2397 0.3750 0.3899 0.4319 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.5308 p-value = 0.7613 p-value = 0.6788 p-value = 0.7806 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.0441 p-value = 0.4974 p-value = 0.2585 p-value = 0.4118 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -6.950*** -6.075*** -5.095** -4.684 
(0.933) (1.936) (2.137) (11.618) 
PACXGE -0.254 
(2.536) 
GDP,, 0.0002 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.018** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
GDPj 3.68e-06* 
(2.05e-06) 
HC明 -0.695 -0.440 0.151 
(0.557) (0.601) (0.660) 
P ^ -0.099* -0.092 -0.065 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.057) 
^ -0.894*** -0.966*** -2.271 
(0.239) (0.246) (2.672) 
涵 2 0.068 
(0.047) 
FDI 0.759 0.661 
(0.818) (0.817) 
7 0.091 0.046 
(0.110) (0.110) 
Constant 22.843*** 40.355*** 37.023*** 50.544*** 
(1.811) (4.566) (5.424) (13.549) 
No. of observations 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1112 0.4241 0.4201 0.4396 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.0660 p-value = 0.2822 p-value = 0.2187 p-value = 0.4724 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.8562 p-value = 0.0035 p-value = 0.0240 p-value = 0.0333 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5 . 1 : Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC 1.626 8.091 8.885 10.999 
(1.113) (6.623) (6.174) (8.317) 
PACXW： -1.113 -1.115 -1.458 
(1.141) (1.060) (1.382) 
GDP们 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0005** 0.0002 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009) 
3.05e-08 
(7.65e-08) 
HQ„ 0.306 0.948** 0.957** 
(0.378) (0.404) (0.413) 
TRIM -0.037 -o.oii -0.005 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.050) 
远 1.163 1.125 1.388 
(1.160) (1.079) (1.382) 
( & 尸 0 . 0 0 2 
(0.017) 
TW! 0.816*** 0.803*** 
(0.264) (0.275) 
7 0.035 0.034 
(0.038) (0.040) 
Constant 7.358*** -0.631 -6.322 -7.386 
(1.446) (7.788) (7.436) (8.529) 
No. of observations 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2500 0.2316 0.3396 0.3139 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.3868 p-value = 0.5443 p-value = 0.2493 p-value = 0.3038 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.0141 p-value = 0.0286 p-value = 0.0402 p-value = 0.0746 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -0.088 -3.296* -3.309* -1.602 
(0.757) (1.742) (1.707) (1.748) 
0.395* 0.392* 0.192 
(0.199) (0.199) (0.207) 
GDP明 -0.0007 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.007*** 
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
GDPj 0.00000121** 
(0.000000575) 
-0.916*** -0.941*** -0.610* 
(0.339) (0.346) (0.356) 
p M / -0.126*** -0.112*** -0.077** 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
^ -0.793*** -0.829*** -1.571*** 
(0.185) (0.186) (0.416) 
( ^ y 0.040* 
(0.022) 
J d I 0.050 0.132 
(0.143) (0.143) 
7 0.067* 0.065* 
(0.034) (0.033) 
Constant 丨 3.738*** 30.460*** 28.858*** 32.276*** 
(1.001) (2.331) (2.422) (2.642) 
No. of observations 71 71 71 71 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0139 0.5096 0.5303 0.5699 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.3791 p-value = 0.6460 p-value = 0.7261 p-value = 0.4603 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.4398 p-value = 0.2895 p-value = 0.1203 p-value = 0.1940 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC 1.834* 5.764* 6.094** 6.976** 
(1.072) (2.988) (2.973) (2.978) 
PACXGE -0.317 -0.302 -0.445 
(0.291) (0.290) (0.285) 
GDP,, -0.0003 -0.002* -0.002* -0.011*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
GDPj 0.00000223** 
(0.000001) 
HC粉 -1.780** -1.569** -1.046 
(0.600) (0.646) (0.658) 
J M l -0.044 -0.032 -0.004 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) 
^ -0.403 -0.453* -1.823** 
(0.244) (0.246) (0.856) 
( 弼 0.057 
(0.037) 
FDI 0.323 0.420 
(0.290) (0.281) 
7 0.030 0.030 
(0.028) (0.026) 
Constant 13.537*** 28.485*** 26.264*** 36.627*** 
(1.417) (4.968) (5.081) (6.530) 
No. of observations 71 71 71 71 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0161 0.2443 0.2599 0.3222 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.2849 p-value = 0.2473 p-value = 0.5450 p-value = 0.4201 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.3698 p-value = 0.0096 p-value = 0.0211 p-value = 0.7515 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1，the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -0.736 -6.704*** -7.289*** -5.948*** 
(0.805) (1.840) (1.944) (2.087) 
P A C x ^ 0.688*** 0.706*** 0.462* 
(0.241) (0.250) (0.273) 
GDP,, 0.0002 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0006 
(0.0003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP, / -5.81e-08 
(1.47e-07) 
HC叫 -0.241 -0.285 -0.105 
(0.497) (0.503) (0.501) 
T r i m -0.159*** -0.147*** -0.136*** 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.043) 
^ -0.996*** -1.061*** -1.794** 
(0.232) (0.245) (0.447) 
0.051** 
(0.025) 
T o i -0.004 -0.022 
(0.130) (0.131) 
7 0.066 0.057 
(0.063) (0.062) 
Constant 12.199*** 27.978*** 27.004*** 28.2089*** 
(0.987) (2.994) (3.142) (3.463) 
No. of observations 71 71 71 71 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0112 0.4439 0.4372 0.4584 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.6755 p-value = 0.5189 p-value = 0.6425 p-value = 0.3455 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.2525 p-value = 0.5953 p-value = 0.3775 p-value = 0.6289 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -0.711 0.390 0.317 1.232 
(1.001) (2.706) (2.724) (2.721) 
P A C x ^ -0.149 -0.086 -0.232 
(0.295) (0.306) (0.300) 
GDP糾 -0.0005 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.010*** 
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
GDPj 1.82e-06*** 
(9.12e-07) 
HC彻 -1.169** -1.087** -0.641 
(0.523) (0.542) (0.556) 
T B m -0.080* -0.065 -0.029 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.046) 
^ -0.726*** -0.825*** -2.183*** 
(0.252) (0.271) (0.819) 
( 淀 0 . 0 6 6 
(0.041) 
J o i 0.171 0.252 
(0.194) (0.196) 
7 ‘ 0.036 0.037 
(0.032) (0.031) 
Constant 16.320*** 33.810*** 32.502*** 40.327*** 
(1.323) (4.166) (4.228) (5.228) 
No. of observations 71 71 71 71 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0182 0.3170 0.3234 0.3731 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.3116 p-value = 0.1927 p-value = 0.1393 p-value = 0.3367 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.3625 p-value = 0.2695 p-value = 0.2002 p-value = 2511 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC 0.768 -5.080*** -6.299*** -5.611** 
(0.744) (1.824) (2.013) (2.144) 
PACx'^ 0.721*** 0.755*** 0.606** 
(0.207) (0.208) (0.236) 
GDP,, 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
GDP,,' -3.90e-08 
(6.06e-08) 
"Q, 0.644 0.643 0.554 
(0.405) (0.414) (0.416) 
p m i -0.157*** -0.146*** -0.146*** 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.043) 
^ -0.799*** -0.893*** -1.255*** 
(0.210) (0.219) (0.374) 
(淀尸 0.025 
(0.018) 
FDJ -0.079 -0.097 
(0.129) (0.129) 
7 0.085 0.081 
(0.055) (0.055) 
Constant 8.896*** 17.341*** 16.360*** 17.660*** 
(0.905) (4.007) (4.206) (4.580) 
No. of observations 71 71 71 71 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0109 0.4622 0.4654 0.4705 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.4480 p-value = 0.8929 p-value = 0.9726 p-value = 0.5243 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.9008 p-value = 0.4492 p-value = 0.2076 p-value = 0.1780 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -4.008*** -9.399*** -6.625** -5.56* 
(1.207) (2.770) (2.877) (2.908) 
P A C x ^ 1.038** 0.712 0.474 
(0.466) (0.513) (0.527) 
GDP明 -0.001 -0.002* -0.003*** -0.011** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
CDPj 0.00000260* 
(0.00000143) 
HC的 -1.025** -0.851* -0.361 
(0.424) (0.425) (0.500) 
pMJ -0.226*** -0.220*** -0.201*** 
(0.055) (0.050) (0.049) 
^ -0.954** -0.762 -1.756** 
(0.391) (0.499) (0.856) 
0.070 
(0.056) 
W l 0.119 0.150** 
(0.071) (0.071) 
7 0.142*** 0.116** 
(0.052) (0.052) 
Constant 20.480*** 36.079*** 30.926*** 38.484*** 
(1.888) (3.772) (3.509) (4.922) 
No. of observations 45 45 45 45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2189 0.5807 0.6640 0.6858 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.0396 p-value = 0.0863 p-value = 0.4113 p-value = 0.4298 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.8751 p-value = 0.0034 p-value = 0.0616 p-value = 0.0942 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -6.180** -7.932** -0.830 -1.694 
(3.165) (3.238) (5.826) (5.875) 
PACXGE -0.262 -0.300 
(0.860) (0.851) 
GDP粉 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004* -0.030** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.014) 
GDP,,' 0.00000768* 
0.00000402 
HC糾 -2.571** -1.871 -0.510 
(1.257) (1.163) (1.320) 
p m i -0.587** -0.362*** -0.406*** 
(0.232) (0.125) (0.130) 
^ 0.308 0.024 0.007 
(0.690) (0.750) (2.082) 
i ^ y -0.016 
(0.105) 
雨 0.431*** 0.464*** 
(0.095) (0.099) 
7 -0.055 -0.069 
(0.059) (0.058) 
Constant 25.500*** 57.003*** 45.552*** 62.210*** 
(4.191) (15.634) (9.196) (15.542) 
No. of observations 45 45 45 45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0748 0.3504 0.5576 0.5818 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.3293 p-value = 0.0024 p-value = 0.3024 p-value = 0.4298 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.8906 p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0006 p-value = 0.0093 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -3.353*** -10.443*** -14.272*** -11.630*** 
(1.030) (2.901) (3.480) (3.690) 
PACx'^ 1.593** 2.019*** 1.227 
(0.641) (0.687) (0.793) 
GDP似 -0.00007 -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.002 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) 
GDP,,' 9.12e-08 
(8.48e-08) 
HC似 -0.583 -0.565 -0.146 
(0.781) (0.754) (0.779) 
PRIM -0.097 -0.099 -0.076 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
^ -1.810*** -2.398*** -4.283*** 
(0.655) (0.731) (1-231) 
m f 0.175* 
(0.094) 
Tdi -0.164 -0.205 
(0.124) (0.125) 
7 0.116* 0.187** 
(0.059) (0.084) 
Constant 18.158*** 32.149*** 33.909*** 37.8283*** 
(1.286) (4.528) (5.056) (5.418) 
No. of observations 45 45 45 45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1639 0.3810 0.4363 0.4594 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.2070 p-value = 0.2434 p-value = 0.3165 p-value = 0.4298 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.3365 p-value = 0.0868 p-value = 0.0091 p-value = 0.0055 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -7.366*** -8.665* -5.718 -5.544 
(2.185) (4.438) (3.920) (3.794) 
P A C x ^ 0.004 0.228 0.109 
(0.692) (0.661) (0.637) 
GDP,, -0.002 -0.004* -0.005*** -0.025*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) 
GDP明' 5.97e-06** 
(2.51e-06) 
HC,, -1.588** -1.188 -0.104 
(0.692) (0.747) (0.846) 
p M I -0.436*** -0.313*** -0.311*** 
(0.128) (0.078) (0.078) 
^ -0.019 -0.540 -1.345 
(0.546) (0.599) (1.472) 
(GEy 0.034 
(0.085) 
丽 0.310*** 0.363*** 
(0.084) (0.085) 
7 0.037 0.020 
(0.054) (0.052) 
Constant 28.591*** 51.061*** 44.867*** 59.016*** 
(2.894) (7.637) (5.629) (9.151) 
No. of observations 45 45 45 45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2523 0.5744 0.6824 0.7135 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.1739 p-value = 0.0481 p-value = 0.2916 p-value = 0.4298 
—Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.9769 p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0011 p - v a l u e = 0 . 0 7 6 8 _ 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.16; Estimation Results of Using Data of Zhejiang and Fujian 
Non-Mountainous Counties from 1989-2003 
_ Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAC -0.398 -6.246 -6.752 -4.022 
(0.922) (3.813) (4.753) (5.320) 
P A C x ' ^ 1.148 1.108 0.594 
(0.698) (0.826) (1.034) 
GDP们 0.00003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0006 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
GDP,,' -3.33e-08 
(2.51e-08) 
HC„ -0.407 -0.070 0.357 
(0.538) (0.626) (0.635) 
p m l -0.056 -0.048 -0.018 
(0.075) (0.074) (0.073) 
^ -1.092* -1.266 -2.320** 
(0.593) (0.752) (1.114) 
(ge)' 0.116 
(0.095) 
FDI -0.058 -0.084 
(0.157) (0.151) 
7 0.093 0.066 
(0.060) (0.074) 
Constant 12.865*** 22.429*** 19.492** 16.300* 
(1.184) (6.258) (8.053) (8.072) 
No. of observations 45 45 45 45 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0398 -0.0420 -0.0255 0.0582 
White Test for Hetero p-value = 0.6721 p-value = 0.7547 p-value = 0.3602 p-value = 0.4298 
Ramsey RESET Test p-value = 0.0317 p-value = 0.0425 p-value = 0.2089 p-value = 0.1659 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significant at 1 percent level. ** 
denotes statistical significant at 5 percent level. * denotes statistical significant at 10 percent level. 
2. If the p-value of White Test is smaller than 0.1, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected. We use Heteroscedasticity Robust Estimator if null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.21 Summary of Estimation Results ofPy4Cand PACy.GE 
P^C Dummy Interacting Term P^CxG^ 
Total Number of . 
Estimations 洲 
Number of Significant . . 
Coefficient ^^ 
Number of Significant . 
Positive Coefficient 
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Figure 2.2 Administrative Hierarchy of Zhejiang 
In 1983 
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Figure 2.4 Map of Zhejiang 
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Figure 2.5 Map of Fujian 
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